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Abstract 
 
In the financial arena, the era of globalization has brought countless advances to the economies, 
providing growth, job creation and expanding international markets. On the other hand, it has 
carried out detrimental consequences, such as the internationalization of financial 
vulnerabilities for organized crime to accomplish their undertakings. Whereas different 
concerns, money laundering and terrorist financing often explore the same loopholes to perform 
their activities, either because of the anonymity, obscurity or opacity required for the 
achievement of their ends. Tax havens play an important role on such times: by offering a no 
or low levy and a weak regulation environment, they entice a great volume of non-resident 
financial activities and provide the perfect spot not just to avoid taxation, but as well as take in 
illegitimate capital flows connected to criminal endeavours. Such financial refuges enable 
illegal activities to take place by granting the indispensable secrecy and confidentiality to 
individuals and companies to achieve their unlawful agenda, frequently behind layers of 
complex business structures. The misappropriation of the financial system to conduit illicit or 
even licit schedules as to produce money laundering and terrorist funding unavoidably imperils 
the world society and its welfare. Bearing in mind that engagements of illegitimate capital may 
harm the trustworthiness, soundness and confidence of the financial institutions as a whole and 
that money laundering and terrorist financing performances are persistently completed on an 
international environment, the effort to battle them must be global. On that account, the present 
study aspires to uncover the linkage between the failures provided by offshore jurisdictions in 
terms of fiscal efficiency that further allow the upsurge and propagation of such harmful 
attempts. In order to provide an enrichment of existing international mechanisms and standards, 
to enhance strategies that consistently deliver transparency, address challenges and track 
solutions must be accomplished in a joint and worldwide scale. 
 
Keywords: AML / CFT; money laundering; terrorism financing; offshore financial centres; 
fiscal efficiency. 
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Resumo 
 
Na arena financeira, a era da globalização trouxe inúmeros avanços para as economias, 
proporcionando crescimento, criação de empregos e expansão dos mercados internacionais. 
Por outro lado, tem levado a consequências prejudiciais, como a internacionalização das 
vulnerabilidades financeiras para o crime organizado realizar seus empreendimentos. Ainda 
que preocupações distintas, a lavagem de dinheiro (branqueamento de capitais) e o 
financiamento do terrorismo frequentemente exploram as mesmas lacunas para realizar suas 
atividades, seja por causa do anonimato, da obscuridade ou da opacidade exigida para a 
realização de seus fins. Os paraísos fiscais desempenham um papel importante em tais tempos: 
ao oferecer um imposto mínimo ou nulo e um ambiente regulatório fraco, atraem um grande 
volume de atividades financeiras de não residentes e constituem o local perfeito não apenas 
para evitar a tributação, mas também receber fluxos ilegítimos de capital ligados a atividades 
criminais. Tais refúgios financeiros permitem que atividades ilícitas ocorram, garantindo o 
sigilo e a confidencialidade indispensáveis a indivíduos e empresas para cumprir sua agenda 
ilegal, muitas vezes por trás de camadas de estruturas empresariais complexas. A utilização 
danosa do sistema financeiro para conduzir cronogramas ilícitos ou até mesmo lícitos para 
produzir lavagem de dinheiro e financiamento do terrorismo inevitavelmente coloca em risco 
a sociedade mundial e seu bem-estar. Tendo em conta que o emprego de capital ilegítimo pode 
prejudicar a confiabilidade, solidez e fidúcia das instituições financeiras como um todo e que 
os comportamentos de lavagem de dinheiro e financiamento do terrorismo são 
persistentemente concluídos em um ambiente internacional, o esforço para combatê-los deve 
ser global. Nesse sentido, o presente estudo pretende revelar a ligação entre as falhas 
fornecidas pelas jurisdições offshore em termos de eficiência fiscal que permitem o aumento e 
a propagação de tais ocorrências prejudiciais. A fim de proporcionar o enriquecimento dos 
mecanismos e padrões internacionais existentes, o aprimoramento de estratégias que 
consistentemente forneçam transparência, abordem os desafios e viabilizem soluções deve ser 
realizado em escala conjunta e mundial. 
 
Palavras-chave: AML / CFT; lavagem de dinheiro (branqueamento de capitais); 
financiamento do terrorismo; centros financeiros offshore; eficiência fiscal. 
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Resumo 
 
Considerada a fase mais sofisticada do capitalismo, a era da globalização trouxe 
avanços incomensuráveis para as economias, proporcionando crescimento, criação de 
empregos, gerando retornos de capital e expandindo os mercados internacionais. Não obstante 
o século XXI ter fornecido inúmeras inovações e progressos tecnológicos, graves desigualdades 
econômicas e sociais elevaram o alerta de que algo resultou criticamente errado no arranjo 
financeiro mundial, levando a cabo consequências negativas e agravando as falhas de mercado. 
Como protagonista estratégico dessa questão, os Centros Financeiros Offshores são 
jurisdições que magnetizam uma grande quantidade de empreendimentos financeiros de não 
residentes, proporcionando fáceis movimentos financeiros, ao prometer pouca ou nenhuma 
tributação e regulamentação, ocultação e sigilo para permitir o fluxo livre de capital. Ao facilitar 
a crescente mobilidade das receitas, as políticas dos Centros Financeiros Offshores oferecem o 
lugar perfeito não apenas para evitar a tributação, mas também os as transações de capitais 
ilícitos ligados a atividades criminosas, como branqueamento de capitais e financiamento do 
terrorismo. 
Em um panorama amplo, o branqueamento de capitais pode ser descrito como a 
tentativa de camuflar a fonte ilícita de dinheiro advindo de atividades criminosas para então 
assimilá-lo em sistemas financeiros legítimos de tal maneira que ele não possa ser distinguidos 
de ativos adquiridos por meios legítimos – em outras palavras, é o ato de branquear recursos 
gerados por atividades criminosas para obscurecer a conexão entre os fundos e suas origens 
ilegais com o objetivo de evitar a prossecução legal. O processo de branqueamento de capitais 
é, além disso, descrito como o meio de vida através do qual organizações criminosas realizam 
suas atividades, permitindo que figuras ilegais, como corruptos e evasores de impostos possam 
desfrutar pacificamente dos benefícios de seus crimes. 
Por outro lado, o financiamento global do terrorismo é a prática que sustenta os 
rendimentos financeiros para financiar atividades terroristas. É bem sabido que os ataques de 
11 de setembro marcaram o ponto de virada na história mundial e o início da chamada Guerra 
ao Terror, que foi seguida por incontáveis eventos terroristas em todo o mundo. A cooperação 
reforçada entre os países melhorou as medidas para prevenir ou limitar os impactos das 
ocorrências de terrorismo. Abordar a gênese do levantamento de fundos para fins terroristas – 
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que podem ser fornecidos por fontes legais ou ilegais – representa a chave para desabilitar esse 
tipo de agenda ilegal. 
Apesar de temas diferentes, o branqueamento de capitais e o financiamento do 
terrorismo frequentemente exploram as mesmas lacunas para identificar formas de prosperar 
suas atividades, seja por causa do anonimato, obscuridade ou opacidade exigida para a 
realização dessas transações. Nesse sentido, os paraísos fiscais facilitam os crimes financeiros 
(por exemplo, branqueamento de capitais, financiamento do terrorismo e evasão fiscal), 
fornecendo o sigilo necessário a indivíduos e empresas para cumprir sua agenda ocultando as 
informações de sua real identidade por trás das camadas de estruturas empresariais complexas. 
Alguns entes corporativos – principalmente trusts, empresas-fantasmas, parcerias, 
holdings, fundações e outras corporações com características de responsabilidade reduzida – 
executam uma ampla variedade de atividades empresariais e representam a base para uma gama 
abrangente de negócios em economias baseadas no mercado internacional. Não obstante as 
ocupações imperativas e válidas que conduzem na economia mundial, há um evidente estigma 
relacionado aos Centros Financeiros Offshore, uma vez que eles são implicados em esquemas 
de branqueamento de capitais e outros engajamentos ilícitos por esconder e transferir 
empreendimentos criminosos para permitir que tais lucros sejam obtidos e após retornar ao 
sistema financeiro como se legítimos fossem. 
Neste cenário, a apropriação indevida do sistema financeiro para conduzir 
itinerários ilegais ou mesmo legítimos para produzir branqueamento de capitais e o 
financiamento do terrorismo inevitavelmente ameaça a confiabilidade, a operacionalidade e a 
solidez da rede internacional. Considerando que arranjos de dinheiro ilícito podem prejudicar a 
confiabilidade, solidez e fidúcia das instituições financeiras como um todo e que os 
comportamentos de branqueamento de capitais e financiamento do terrorismo são 
recorrentemente realizados em um ambiente internacional, o esforço para combatê-los deve ser 
global. 
Com base nessas premissas, o presente estudo tem como objetivo expor a ligação 
entre as lacunas proporcionados pelas jurisdições offshore em termos de eficiência fiscal que 
possibilitem o aumento e a proliferação de tais crimes financeiros, a fim de fornecer 
enriquecimento aos atuais mecanismos e padrões internacionais. 
Em tais esforços, é de suma importância o papel desempenhado pelas jurisdições e 
organizações, especialmente pela Organização para a Cooperação e o Desenvolvimento 
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Económico (OCDE), o Grupo de Acção Financeira Internacional (GAFI) e os órgãos da União 
Europeia (União Europeia), que devem continuar a considerar as mudanças nos padrões, à luz 
de novas configurações emergentes com relação ao surgimento de novas ameaças e 
vulnerabilidades ao sistema financeiro global. A globalização torna necessário fortalecer a 
assistência mútua e a troca de informações entre Estados, a fim de evitar os efeitos negativos 
do aumento do fluxo livre e sem vigilância de capitais no mercado internacional. 
Em mais uma avaliação, uma questão permanece factual: a regulação contra 
branqueamento de capitais e o financiamento do terrorismo tornou-se a pedra angular de um 
cronograma mais denso para combater as atividades criminosas, negando aos infratores as 
compensações ilícitas e perseguindo administrativa e judicialmente aqueles que ajudam a 
realizar tais comportamentos. O reforço de aplicação da lei também desempenha um papel 
decisivo na obstrução da criminalidade, uma vez que a remoção do incentivo financeiro para 
cometer delitos com o rastreamento, congelamento e confiscação dos lucros é crucial para 
reduzir a possibilidade financeira dos criminosos. 
Um dos principais desafios que devem ser abordados reside especificamente nas 
diferentes discrepâncias de regulamentação entre os países, que, como consequência, 
proporcionam um meio frágil e tolerem que atividades ilícitas ocorram, se não sob os olhares 
domésticos, em jurisdições offshores que o permitam. Um padrão mínimo e uniforme, apesar 
das diferenças legislativas entre as nações, como já está começando a ser estabelecido por 
organizações mundiais é, portanto, essencial para proporcionar uma mínima estabilidade do 
sistema financeiro como um todo. 
O papel desempenhado pelos paraísos fiscais sofreria consideráveis danos se a 
transparência financeira se tornasse um padrão inescapável e unificado. A partir desta 
perspectiva, a transparência financeira internacional é uma questão crucial para que o Estado 
fiscal moderno seja capaz de produzir mudanças substanciais e irrevogáveis. Para combater o 
terrorismo e o branqueamento de bens, é essencial dispor de um intercâmbio de informações 
ideal e de dados precisos, a fim de permitir a desconstrução da agenda da criminalidade 
organizada. 
Com esse conhecimento em mente, é importante notar que as nações sozinhas não 
possuem a autossuficiência e capacidade de combater inteiramente e efetivamente as ações 
prejudiciais decorrentes da globalização, que podem e serão melhor alcançadas em nível global. 
O desenvolvimento e o aprimoramento de regulamentações mais severas são necessários, até 
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mesmo indispensáveis, mas seria inócuo acreditar que seriam facilmente aceito, pois a maioria 
dos países dificilmente aceitariam sem sanções. 
Apesar do facto de não ser claro se os valores de referência já adoptados por 
organismos internacionais como o GAFI, o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), a OCDE e a 
UE resultarão em resultados eficazes, é decisivo buscar esforços conjuntamente para procurar 
um justo, eficiente e, acima de tudo, transparente arranjo internacional. 
Eleitos entre as principais preocupações da Agenda Europeia de Segurança, 
prevenir e combater o branqueamento de capitais e o financiamento do terrorismo são cruciais 
e suas ameaças progressivas devem ser acompanhadas por rápidas evoluções em relação às 
regulamentações contra seus efeitos, principalmente aquelas que aumentam os mecanismos de 
transparência no campo da troca de informações. 
A informação financeira é o ativo mais importante e estratégico no combate ao 
branqueamento de capitais, ao financiamento do terrorismo e à contenda de ofensas severas em 
uma perspectiva mais ampla. Levando em conta o fato de que os branqueadores de capital, 
terroristas e outros infratores da lei realizam suas irregularidades em todo o mundo, 
principalmente pela transferência de renda ilegal de uma jurisdição para outra, explorando 
ambientes legislativos fracos, é imperativa a informação financeira para lidar com essa 
variedade de performances prejudiciais em um mundo interconectado. 
Neste sentido, o alargamento da troca de informações a pedido (EoIR) e a 
introdução do Intercâmbio Automático de Informação (AEoI) marcaram uma mudança radical 
na transparência fiscal e na capacidade de as administrações fiscais combaterem as actividades 
offshore e, consequentemente, os esforços subsistentes de branqueamento de capitais e 
financiamento de terrorismo. 
No panorama mundial, é claramente perceptível que não será possível esgotar os 
riscos do branqueamento de capitais e do financiamento do terrorismo, à medida que novas 
estruturas surgem todos os dias, explorando diferentes fragilidades e violações dos sistemas 
financeiros. Aperfeiçoar a transparência, enfrentar desafios e acompanhar com persistência as 
soluções globalmente é decisivo para que os esforços do crime organizado não se tornem uma 
característica permanente e arraigada de um processo de globalização que apenas promova a 
desigualdade, mas também proporcione uma concorrência mais justa em um ambiente 
financeiro sólido e confiável, sob o prisma da eficiência fiscal. 
 
 8 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AEoI Automatic Exchange of Information 
AML  Anti-Money Laundering 
BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
CDD  Customer Due Diligence 
CFT  Countering the Financing of Terrorism or Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
CRS Common Reporting Standard  
CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee 
DNFBP Designated Non-Financial Business and Profession 
DTA Double Taxation Agreement 
EC European Council 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
EEC European Economic Community 
EoIR Exchange of Information on Request 
EP European Parliament 
EU European Union 
FATCA Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
FATF  Financial Action Task Force 
FDI Foreign Direct Investments 
 9 
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit 
FSI Financial Secrecy Index 
G20 Group of Twenty 
G7 Group of Seven 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
HNWI High-Net-Worth Individual 
IBC International Business Company or Corporation 
ICIJ International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRS Internal Revenue Service  
ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs Council 
KYC Know Your Client / Customer 
MAC Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
ML  Money Laundering 
MLI Multilateral Instrument  
MNC Multinational Company or Corporation 
MNE Multinational Enterprise 
NCCT Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories  
NPI Non-Profit Institution 
 10 
NPO Non-Profit Organisations 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
OFC Offshore Financial Centre / Center 
OJ Official Journal of the European Union 
PEP  Politically Exposed Person 
PNR Passenger Name Record 
RBA  Risk-Based Approach 
RES Resolution 
SPE Special Purpose Entity 
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle 
STR  Suspicious Transaction Report 
TEU Treaty of the European Union 
TF Terrorist / Terrorism Financing 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TJN Tax Justice Network  
TPB Terrorism Prevention Branch  
UN  United Nations 
UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption 
UNODC UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
USA / US United States of America 
 
 11 
CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 1 
Abstract...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Resumo ....................................................................................................................................... 3 
Resumo ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ 8 
CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................ 11 
PART I ..................................................................................................................................... 15 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 15 
CHAPTER 1 – A GENERAL INTRODUCTION ...............................................................15 
PART II ................................................................................................................................... 18 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND GLOBAL TERRORISM FINANCING ......................... 18 
CHAPTER 1 – MONEY LAUNDERING ............................................................................18 
2.1.1. Money laundering: a methodological approach .........................................................18 
2.1.1.1. Historical and legal background ..............................................................................18 
2.1.1.2. Theoretical and legal delimitation ...........................................................................22 
2.1.1.2.1. Money laundering definitions ..............................................................................22 
2.1.1.2.2. Legislative developments .....................................................................................23 
2.1.1.3. Stages and techniques of money laundering ...........................................................25 
CHAPTER 2 – GLOBAL TERRORISM FINANCING .....................................................28 
2.2.1. Criminalization of terrorism and its financing ...........................................................29 
2.2.1.1. Historical and legal background ..............................................................................29 
2.2.1.2. Defining global terrorism financing ........................................................................32 
2.2.1.2.1. Conceptual delineation .........................................................................................32 
2.2.1.2.2. Legal provisions ...................................................................................................34 
 12 
2.2.1.3. Methods of terrorism financing ...............................................................................35 
2.2.1.3.1. Main TF practices ................................................................................................36 
CHAPTER 3 – AML / CFT COMPLIANCE ARCHITECTURE .....................................38 
2.3.1. Financial Action Task Force outcomes ......................................................................38 
2.3.2. AML / CFT comprehensive legislative framework ...................................................41 
2.3.2.1. AML / CFT Directives ............................................................................................42 
2.3.2.1.1. Previous achievements .........................................................................................42 
2.3.2.1.2. The 5th EU AML / CFT Directive ........................................................................44 
PART III .................................................................................................................................. 46 
OFFSHORE JURISDICTIONS ............................................................................................ 46 
CHAPTER 1 – AN OFFSHORE ASSESSMENT ................................................................46 
3.1.1. Financial scandals ......................................................................................................46 
3.1.2. OFCs and tax havens – a historical development ......................................................48 
3.1.3. Evaluating possible differences among multi-varied terminologies ..........................51 
3.1.3.1. Tax Havens..............................................................................................................52 
3.1.3.2. Offshore Financial Centres .....................................................................................54 
CHAPTER 2 – MONITORING THE GREY ZONE ..........................................................56 
3.2.1. Tax havens, offshore jurisdictions and non-cooperative countries lists ....................57 
3.2.2. AML / CFT regimes and high-risk third-country monitoring lists ............................64 
PART IV .................................................................................................................................. 67 
THE PRISM OF FISCAL EFFICIENCY ............................................................................ 67 
CHAPTER 1 – UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL EFFICIENCY PROBLEM ............67 
4.1.1. Pareto efficient tax structures .....................................................................................69 
4.1.2. Taxation and economic efficiency .............................................................................71 
4.1.3. Offshores and tax efficiency ......................................................................................73 
4.1.4. Why list jurisdictions and is it effective? ...................................................................75 
 13 
CHAPTER 2 – PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERING AND GLOBAL TERRORISM 
FINANCING THROUGH OFFSHORES JURISDICTIONS UNDER THE PRISM OF 
FISCAL EFFICIENCY ..........................................................................................................79 
4.2.1. The use of OFCs for criminal purposes – loopholes to ML and TF ..........................80 
4.2.1.1. Bank Secrecy and financial havens – a confidentiality problem ............................80 
4.2.1.2. Offshore companies as complex business designs ..................................................84 
4.2.1.3. OFCs and their role in the money-laundering cycle ...............................................87 
4.2.1.4. The tangled relation between money laundering and tax evasion ..........................89 
CHAPTER 3 – ASSESSING BREACHES AND TRACKING SOLUTIONS ..................92 
4.3.1. International cooperation: a key to tackle money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism through offshore jurisdictions...............................................................................92 
4.3.1.1. Exchange of Information mechanisms ....................................................................94 
4.3.1.2. Financial Intelligence Units role .............................................................................97 
PART V .................................................................................................................................. 101 
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 101 
References .............................................................................................................................. 105 
Bibliographic References......................................................................................................105 
Documents of International Bodies .....................................................................................111 
European Parliament ..........................................................................................................111 
European Union .................................................................................................................111 
Financial Action Task Force ..............................................................................................112 
International Monetary Fund..............................................................................................113 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development .............................................114 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Council of Europe .......115 
Tax Justice Network ...........................................................................................................115 
United Nations ...................................................................................................................115 
Jurisprudence ........................................................................................................................115 
 14 
Legislation ..............................................................................................................................115 
Council of the European Union..........................................................................................115 
European Union .................................................................................................................115 
European Commission .......................................................................................................117 
European Parliament and Council of the European Union ................................................118 
United Nations ...................................................................................................................119 
United Nations General Assembly .....................................................................................119 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime .......................................................................120 
United Nations Security Council .......................................................................................120 
United States of America ...................................................................................................121 
GENERAL PLAN ................................................................................................................. 122 
  
 15 
PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
CHAPTER 1 – A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
During 1st century AD in the ancient Roman empire, urine was largely used as a 
cleaning agent for washing clothes, for brushing teeth and as well as tanning leather, due to its 
main component ammonia. Eventually, so much urine was used and collected in the empire that 
a tax was imposed by Roman emperor Vespasian (AD 69–79), creating what was known as the 
vectigal urinae, which translates from Latin into urine tax1. This practice gave birth to the 
Vespasian’s most famous Latin adage Pecunia non olet2, which self-evident connotation was 
to illustrate that money, and therefore its due taxation, is never to be stained despite its geneses3.  
Considered to be the most sophisticated stage of capitalism, the era of globalization 
has brought immeasurable advances to the economies, providing growth, job creation and 
generating capital returns by expanding international markets. Nonetheless the 21st century has 
provided countless innovations and technological progresses, severe economic and social 
inequalities upraised the alertness that something critically went wrong in the worldwide 
financial arrangement, with the appearance of detrimental consequences and the aggravation of 
market failures.4 
As a strategic protagonist of this edge, Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs)5 are 
jurisdictions that magnetize a great amount of non-resident financial endeavours, providing 
                                                 
1 Beard, Mary (2015), SPQR: A history of ancient Rome, London: Profile Books, p. 393. 
2 In the first volume of the Capital, Karl Marx uses non olet to explain the detachment of the commodities 
origins observing that “Since every commodity, on becoming money, disappears as a commodity, it is 
impossible to tell from the money itself, how it got into the hands of its possessor, or what article has 
been changed into it. Non olet, from whatever source it may come.” Marx, Karl (1990), Capital, Volume 
1, Penguin Books, London, p. 205. 
3 This axiom remains nowadays most frequently associated to describe illegal sources of financial gains, 
particularly when unfolding resources for criminal activities that need detachment of their final outcome. 
4 Piketty, Thomas (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge Massachusetts: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. 
5 According to the OECD glossary database, Retrieved from: https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/, Offshore 
Financial Centres are defined as “countries or jurisdictions with financial centres that contain financial 
institutions that deal primarily with nonresidents and / or in foreign currency on a scale out of 
proportion to the size of the host economy. Nonresident-owned or -controlled institutions play a 
significant role within the centre. The institutions in the centre may well gain from tax benefits not 
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effortless movements of assets by promising no or low tax and regulation, concealment and 
secrecy to enable free capital flow. By facilitating the growing mobility of revenues, OFCs 
policies deliver the perfect spot not just to avoid taxation, but as well as illicit financial 
transactions connected to criminal activities, such as money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism.6 
In a wide-ranging landscape, money laundering can be described as the attempt to 
camouflage illicit sources of wealth generated from criminal activities in order to subsequently 
assimilate them into legitimate financial systems in such a way that they cannot be distinguished 
from assets acquired by legitimate means7 – in other words, the act to wash resources produced 
by criminal activity as to obscure the connection between the funds and their illegal origins for 
the purpose of avoiding legal enforcement8. The money laundering process is furthermore 
depicted as the lifeline means through which criminal organisations carry out their activities, 
by allowing illegal performers such as corrupt and tax evaders to peacefully relish the benefits 
of their crimes9. 
On the other hand, global terrorism financing is the practice that supports financial 
incomes in order to fund terrorist activities. It is well known that the attacks of 9/11 marked the 
turning point in world history and the beginning of the so-called War on Terror, which was 
followed by countless terrorists events across the world. The reinforced cooperation between 
countries has improved the measures to prevent or limit terrorism occurrences impacts. To 
tackle the geneses of the funding raise for terrorist purposes – which can be provided by either 
legal or illegal sources10 – represents the key to disable these sorts of unlawful agenda. 
                                                 
available to those outside the centre.” See further at: International Monetary Fund (2003), External Debt 
Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users – Appendix III, Glossary, Washington DC: IMF. 
6 Sikka, Prem (2003), The Role of Offshore Financial Centres in Globalization, Accounting Forum, Vol. 
27, pp. 365-399, Retrieved from http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/WP03-02.pdf 
7 Unger, Brigitte and Van der Linde, Daan (2013), Research Handbook on Money Laundering, Elgar 
Original Reference, pp. 3-16. 
8 McClean, David (2002), International Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 261. 
9 Borlini, Leonardo Sergio (2018), Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the 
International Instruments, Oxford University Press, Yearbook of European Law, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 3287423, pp. 553–598, Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3287423 
10 As in Spahiu, Naim; Bajraktari, Halim and Shterbani, Shefki (2016), Terrorism as a Threat and 
Challenge of Peace and Security in 21st Century, Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference 
‘Contemporary Concepts of Crisis Management’, Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307341, 
terrorist factions progressively advance their activities fund throughout an arrangement of charitable and 
humanitarian organisations, criminal businesses, front companies, dark profitmaking deals, illegal and 
weak regulated banking systems. 
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Whereas completely different matters, money laundering and terrorist financing 
often explore the same loopholes in order to identify ways to thrive its activities, either because 
of the anonymity, obscurity or opacity required for the accomplishment of those transactions.11 
For these endeavours, it has been made clear that tax havens facilitate financial crimes (for 
example money laundering, terrorist financing and tax evasion), by providing the necessary 
secrecy to individuals and companies to perform their harmful agenda through the concealment 
of the true ownership information behind layers of complex business structures. 
Some corporate beings – mainly trusts, shell companies, partnerships, holdings, 
foundations and other corporations with reduced liability features – perform a widespread 
assortment of entrepreneurial activities and represent the foundation for a comprehensive array 
of businesses in market-based economies. Notwithstanding the imperative and valid 
occupations they conduct in the system, there is an evident stigma related to OFCs, since they 
are alleged to be convoluted in money laundering schemes and other illicit engagements by 
camouflaging and shifting criminal undertakings as to enable such profits to be interleaved back 
in the economy as legitimate.12 
In this scenario, the misappropriation of the financial system to conduit unlawful or 
even legitimate itineraries as to produce money laundering and terrorist funding stage an 
inescapably threaten to the reliability, operationality and solidity of the international network.  
Considering that arrangements of illicit money may harm the trustworthiness, 
soundness and confidence of the financial institutions as a whole13 and that money laundering 
                                                 
11 According to the International Monetary Fund, money laundering and terrorist financing constitute a 
threat to the stability of the financial sector and the broader economy. It is so for these illicit activities 
provide discouragement of foreign investment and distort international capital flows, resulting in welfare 
losses, the drain of resources from productive economic activities, and even produce destabilizing 
effects on other countries. In an increasingly interconnected world, the harm done by these activities is 
global. See further at https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-
Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism 
12 European Union (2018), Handbook on the compilation of statistics on illegal economic activities 
in national accounts and balance of payments, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/8714610/KS-05-17-202-EN-
N.pdf/eaf638df-17dc-47a1-9ab7-fe68476100ec 
13 Recital (1) of the Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73–117, In force, Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj, Hereinafter: Fourth AML / CFT Directive. 
 18 
and terrorist financing behaviours are recurrently carried out in an international environment, 
the effort to fight them must be global14. 
On these grounds, the present study aims to expound the link between the failures 
provided by offshore jurisdictions in terms of fiscal efficiency that further enable the increase 
and proliferation of such harmful financial crimes, in order to provide an enrichment of current 
international mechanisms and standards. 
 
PART II 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND GLOBAL TERRORISM FINANCING 
 
CHAPTER 1 – MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
2.1.1. Money laundering: a methodological approach 
 
In order to better comprehend the money laundering predicament, it is imperative a 
methodological approach as to provide a time sequence follow-up understanding of its 
peculiarities, to be achieved through a historical and legal background, a theoretical and legal 
delimitation and a general overview on the main stages and techniques that presently occur. 
 
2.1.1.1. Historical and legal background 
 
Although the expression money laundering (ML) is considered to have been first 
used only in early 20th century15, several historians argument that its practice remotes to ancient 
                                                 
14 Recital (35) of the Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15–36, No longer in force, Date of end of validity: 
25/06/2017; Repealed and replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, Retrieved from http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/60/oj, Hereinafter: 
Third AML / CFT Directive. 
15 As explained by Seagrave, Sterling (1995), Lords of the Rim: The invisible empire of the overseas 
Chinese, New York: Putnam's Sons, in 2000 BC, Chinese merchants were renowned as hiding their 
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history16, whenever occurred any process of turning the revenue of an illegal source into 
legitimate (or at least dishonestly) earnings.17 
Historical encounters apart, it was not until the establishment of the US Bank 
Secrecy Act in 197018 that the term money laundering became a legally typified misconduct 
with imperative counteracting measures19. In 1986, the Money Laundering Control Act made 
ML a federal US crime, introducing civil and criminal penalties application for the Bank 
Secrecy Act violations 20. 
At the international level, from a growing concern of the vast amounts spawned 
from ML related to the increasing drug trafficking activities, in 1988, the United Nations (UN) 
                                                 
wealth from the state to elude taxation and confiscation, moving their fortunes to distant provinces or 
even outside the country. 
16 As referred in Unger, Brigitte and Van der Linde, Daan (2013), Money laundering regulation: from 
Al Capone to Al Qaeda, Research Handbook on Money Laundering, Elgar Original Reference, pp. 19-
32, the term money laundering is cogitated to have been formerly applied by American police in the 
1920s to 1930s in the United States to describe Al Capone and other organised criminals activities – a 
communal method for the mafias to launder their crimes outcomes was by purchasing cash-only 
Laundromats, in order to settle a legitimate source for the dirty money derived from extortion, 
prostitution, gambling and bootlegging. After Al Capone was imprisoned and condemned for tax 
evasion, Meyer Lansky, also called the Mobster’s accountant, developed a further sophisticated money 
laundering technique, known as the loan back concept: disguising illegal revenues by loans provided by 
compliant foreign banks, especially Swiss Bank Accounts. As referred at Robinson, Jeffrey (1996), The 
laundrymen: inside money laundering, the world's third-largest business (1st North American ed.), 
Arcade Pub.: Distributed by Little, Brown, New York, the term money laundering later appeared in 
correlation with the 1973 Watergate scandal. 
17 Other early money laundering activities refer to merchants hiding their profits from local authorities, 
by overstating exchange rates to conceal interests, and how pirates hid a portion of stolen property before 
restoring its legitimacy or melting the gold and making new forms to hide its origins. In the medieval 
age, there have been related processes levelled at disguise in order to provide a lawful appearance to 
money created from usury, which was forbidden and considered outrageously sinful by the Catholic 
church. 
18 The Bank Secrecy Act or the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, is an US Decree that 
obliged financial establishments within the US to support government agencies in uncovering and 
inhibiting ML activities, mostly by requiring those organisations to maintain recordkeeping of 
surpassing $10,000 daily limit cash transactions, also by identifying individuals conducting such 
transactions, and finally by reporting distrustful proceedings that may suggest money laundering, tax 
evasion, or other illegitimate undertakings. 
19 United States of America, Bank Secrecy Act or the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 
Public Law 91-508, 91st Congress, October 26, 1970, Retrieved from 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-84/pdf/STATUTE-84-Pg1114-2.pdf, Hereinafter: 
1970 Bank Secrecy Act. 
20 United States of America, Money Laundering Control Act, Public Law 99-570, 99th Congress, October 
27, 1986, Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-
Pg3207.pdf, Hereinafter: 1986 Money Laundering Control Act. 
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and 106 jurisdictions assembled in Vienna in a Conference for the adoption of a Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.21 
Acknowledging that criminal organisations, through massive earnings begotten 
from drug trafficking, could pollute and degrade the structures of the States in all levels, and 
determined to dispossess individuals engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal 
activities by suppressing their foremost enticement for those accomplishments, the Vienna 
Convention established a series of offences and sanctions related to launder revenues earned 
from drug trafficking. 
By criminalizing drug-related money laundering22 the Vienna Agreement also 
provided a series of procedures on mutual legal assistance in confiscations, investigations, 
prosecutions, judicial proceedings and extraditions, inaugurating a solid ground for future 
international cooperation.  
In retort to the command ascertained by the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention (UNODC) 23 in the 1988 Conference, the Law Enforcement, Organized Crime and 
Anti-Money-Laundering Unit was established, as a means to carry out the Global Programme 
against Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism. 
In 1998, the UNODC labelled money laundering as the main formula of 1990’s 
white-collar crime, bearing in mind it is a key enhancer to countless arrangements of other type 
of illegal activity, particularly by providing sustenance to drug trafficking and financial fraud 
perpetrated by organized crime factions24. 
On 10th of June in the same year, at the 20th Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly, devoted to countering the worlds drug problem together, the Members States of the 
                                                 
21 United Nations, The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988, Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf, 
Hereinafter: 1988 UN Drugs Convention. 
22 Article 3(1)(b) of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention. 
23 Established in 1997 through a merger between the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the 
Centre for International Crime Prevention, the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention (UNODC) is a worldwide front-runner in the fight against illicit drugs and international 
crime, operating in all parts of the world through a widespread system of ground workforces. For more 
information, see https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ 
24 United Nations (1998), Report on Financial Havens, Bank Secrecy, and Money Laundering, United 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Global Programme Against Money Laundering, 
Retrieved from https://www.amnet.co.il/joomla/attachments/UN-
FINANCIAL%20HAVENS%20laundering.pdf 
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UN adopted a Political Declaration and Action Plan Against Money Laundering25, which after 
five biennial reports between 2001 and 200826, was renewed and revised in 2009, as a Political 
Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and 
Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem against ML and with the ambition to 
promote judicial assistance in order to increase international cooperation27.  
In September 2003 and December 2005, the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime28 and the UN Convention against Corruption29, respectively, came into force, 
comprising the main international instruments in the combat against transnational organized 
crime and corruption. 
Jointly, the apparatuses extend ML scope crimes not only by applying its definition 
to the revenues provided by illicit drug trafficking but also by covering the profits of all grave 
offences. By commending States to craft a wide-ranging domestic obliged framework for banks 
and other financial institutions, embracing ordinary and legal persons, as well as any entities 
                                                 
25 United Nations, General Assembly, Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Twentieth special session, A/RES/S-20/2, 21 October 
1998, Retrieved from 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Political_Declaration/Political_Declaration_19
98/1998-Political-Declaration_A-RES-S-20-2.pdf, Hereinafter: 1998 UN Political Declaration and Plan 
of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the 
World Drug Problem. 
26 The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs stipulated the Executive Director of UNODC to organize 
biennial reports centred on progress made of the implementation of the action plans and measures, to be 
provided by Governments information. Between 2001 and 2008, the Commission considered five 
biennial statements on the enactment of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly: 44th 
Session (2001) – First biennial report; 46th  Session (2003) – Second biennial report; 48th  Session (2005) 
– Third biennial report; 50th Session (2007) – Fourth biennial report; 51st Session (2008) – Fifth report, 
Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/Political_Declarations/Political-
Declarations_1998-Declaration.html 
27 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, New 
York, 2009, Retrieved from  https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/V0984963-English.pdf, 
Hereinafter: 2009 UN Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation 
28 United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, A/RES/55/25, 8 January 2001, 
Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf, Hereinafter: 2001 UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
29 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), New York, 2004, Retrieved from 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, 
Hereinafter: 2005 UN Convention against Corruption. 
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susceptible to ML, the Conventions also call for the establishment of the Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs)30. 
 
2.1.1.2. Theoretical and legal delimitation 
 
In an attempt to tackle money laundering undertakings, several organisations, 
international bodies and jurisdictions seek to conceptualize it to provide a delimitation under a 
criminal offence. For this accomplishment, to establish a theoretical as well as a legal definition 
is substantial to address such harmful matter and track solutions to counterattack its activities 
and fallouts from taking place and endure. 
 
2.1.1.2.1. Money laundering definitions 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), money laundering is the practice of disguising illegal gains originated from unlawful 
activities, for instance, by successfully laundering the proceeds of tax crimes, fraud, 
embezzlement, drug trafficking, theft, bribery and corruption offences, inter alia, for the illicit 
gains to be relished without distress of being scrutinized, evaluated and confiscated.31 
In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) understanding, ML is described as the 
handling of proceeds devised by unlawful incidences with the objective to shroud the 
connection between the assets and their illegal sources.32 
Under the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODC) definition, 
regardless of who uses the apparatus of ML, the operational element remain fundamentally 
                                                 
30 The function of the FIUs will be further explored in the topic 4.3.1.2. Financial Intelligence Units 
role.  
31 As stated by the OECD glossary database of terms used in payments and settlement systems, of the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Bank for International Settlements, Money Laundering 
is described as “the attempt to conceal or disguise the ownership or source of the proceeds of criminal 
activity and to integrate them into the legitimate financial systems in such a way that they cannot be 
distinguished from assets acquired by legitimate means.” 
32 International Monetary Fund (2018), The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism, Communications Department, Washington, D.C: IMF, Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-Money-Laundering-
the-Financing-of-Terrorism 
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unchanged: an arrangement by which criminals – whether drug traffickers, corporate 
embezzlers or corrupt public officials – masquerade the illegal origins of their wealth and 
shelter their assets, without compromising them, to profit from the revenues and avoid the 
wariness of law enforcement authorities. To diligently launder assets is also necessary to 
prevent the illegal activities from leaving a trace of implicating proof. Because the money trail 
is evidence of their offence, it is vulnerable to confiscation and thus has to be carefully 
secured.33 
In agreement with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) assessment on ML, it 
is a procedure of critical importance that enables the use of profits generated by individuals or 
groups that carry out criminal acts without jeopardizing their source, by disguising their illegal 
origins. Since criminal activities – such as illegal arms sales, smuggling, and the undertakings 
of organized crime, such as drug trafficking and prostitution rings, embezzlement, insider 
trading, bribery and computer fraud schemes, among others – can generate massive quantities 
of incomes, it is essential to launder the unclean money to be able to benefit from it.34 
In spite of the circumstance that definitions may differ in their terminology, the core 
objective behind ML predicaments is to conceal the unlawful genesis of such activities in order 
to accomplish a genuine outcome for these proceeds through a masked arrangement. Fittingly, 
ML is commonly comprehended as the practice of swapping profits from a wide-scope of 
criminal offenses in order to provide authentic and legitimate coverage.35 
 
2.1.1.2.2. Legislative developments 
 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 200936, ML was categorized among 
the so-called ‘Euro-crimes’ assortment with a detailed law foundation in Article 83(1) of the 
                                                 
33 See further at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/laundrycycle.html 
34 FATF (2018), Professional Money Laundering, FATF, Paris, France, Retrieved from 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodandtrends/documents/professional-money-
laundering.html 
35 Gilmore, William C. (2011), Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 4th Edition, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, p. 34. 
36 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. Signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1–271, In force, Retrieved 
from http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/lis/sign, Hereinafter: 2009 Lisbon Treaty. 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)37, which establishes definitions and 
a minimum standard regarding severe cross-border crimes, that, due to their dimensions, recall 
a particular struggle on a common basis38. 
As specified in Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use 
of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering39, ML implies the following 
enumerated behaviours when wittingly performed: “(i) the conversion or transfer of property, 
knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in 
such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of 
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal 
consequences of his action; (ii) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity; (iii) 
the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property 
was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity; and (iv) 
participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and 
counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the foregoing indents.”40 
 
                                                 
37 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390, In force, Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2012/oj, Hereinafter: TEU and TFEU, respectively. 
38 Article 83(1) TFEU (ex Article 31 TEU) states that “The European Parliament and the Council may, 
by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish 
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly 
serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or 
from a special need to combat them on a common basis. These areas of crime are the following: 
terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, 
computer crime and organised crime. On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a 
decision identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.” 
39 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 amending 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering - Commission Declaration, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 76–82, No longer in force, Date of end 
of validity: 14/12/2005; Implicitly repealed by Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 October 2005, Retrieved from http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/97/oj, Hereinafter: 
Second AML Directive. 
40 Article (1)(C) of the 2nd AML Directive. 
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2.1.1.3. Stages and techniques of money laundering 
 
In a broader perspective, ML methods and techniques have become over time 
progressively intricate. Even though not all money launderers may partake in elaborate 
stratagems to fulfil their ambitions, for criminal organisations, to clean assets that result from 
illicit endeavours is essential for the subsistence, attainment and profit from their activities. It 
is a fact that culprits engage in ML so as to safeguard their illicit agenda and to shield their 
profits from speculation, inquiry and confiscation, by crafting complications to retrace to its 
unlawful geneses.41 
With the purpose of achieving those ends, exceptionally up-to-date ML formulas 
are continuously being crafted and are generally portrayed as having three noteworthy 
consecutive stages: (i) placement, (ii) layering and (iii) integration (thus comprehending 
justification and investment).42 
In the first level of placement or pre-wash stage, the main objective is to deposit 
criminal proceeds into the financial system by moving the funds from direct association with 
the crime, generally cash, into a bank account at home or abroad, smuggled over a border or 
infused with the turnover of a legitimate business. 
The main placement techniques are smurfing and structuring, currency smuggling, 
travellers’ cheques, gambling, casinos, which can be carried out through change of currency 
and denominations, transportation of currencies and cash deposits. Shell companies43 in 
offshore jurisdictions with weaker Anti-Money Laundering (AML) framework are most used 
                                                 
41 Borlini, Leonardo Sergio (2018), Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the 
International Instruments, Oxford University Press, Yearbook of European Law, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 3287423, cit., pp. 553–598. 
42 OECD (2009), Money Laundering Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax Auditors, OECD 
Publishing, Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/crime/money-laundering-awareness-handbook-
for-tax-examiners-and-tax-auditors.pdf 
43 Shell companies allow large quantities of money to be expatriated from side to side by simple 
transfers, in which funds are relocated to the bank accounts of national companies from countless 
jurisdictions, including OFCs. Under the OECD definition in OECD (2008), OECD Benchmark 
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, Fourth Edition, OECD Publishing, p. 241, Retrieved from 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf, a shell company is “a 
company that is formally registered, incorporated, or otherwise legally organised in an economy but 
which does not conduct any operations in that economy other than in a pass-through capacity.” 
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at the placement stage to collect cash payments that are subsequently sent to other 
jurisdictions44. 
In the second layering step, the focus is the covering of the criminal source of the 
profits, by masking the trail to outmanoeuvre the pursuit from government authorities. It is 
achieved specially by transferring and splitting money amidst bank accounts, States, and entities 
(individuals or corporations). Wire Transfers and withdrawals in cash are also most common 
used forms of concealing the incomes criminal geneses, since money can also be taken off and 
consigned into depository accounts with other banks. 
It is also a common practice to use offshore bank accounts in countries that provide 
secrecy laws and to appoint offshore enterprises as the bank account owners. Are described as 
laundering techniques in the layering phase with correspondent banking loan at low or no 
interest rates, back-to-back loans, money exchanges offices, the use of insurance markets, 
fictitious sales and purchases, shell companies, trust offices, special purpose vehicles (or 
entities), underground banking, and black market of foreign currencies.45 
At the layering stage, the launderer may pick an OFC, a large regional business 
centre, a world banking centre, or any location that offers adequate financial or business base. 
It is possible for the laundered funds to transit between bank accounts at diverse places in order 
to leave no trace of the source or last destination46. In this sense, the use of OFCs is harmful for 
it provides the perfect environment to successfully accomplish the money launder. 
The integration phase is the rostrum that provides the money now laundered finally 
to be legally-apparent and available to criminals, with its occupational and often times 
geographic origins concealed from assessment. 
                                                 
44 European Union (2018), Handbook on the compilation of statistics on illegal economic activities 
in national accounts and balance of payments, 2018 Edition, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, p. 107, Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/8714610/KS-05-17-202-EN-N.pdf/eaf638df-17dc-
47a1-9ab7-fe68476100ec 
45 Unger, Brigitte and Verbeken, Dirk (2017), Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings 
and challenges, Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific 
Policy, EU: European Parliament, pp. 16-17, Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/115250/PANA%202016-
04%20ST%20Offshore%20activities%20Final.pdf 
46 European Union (2018), Handbook on the compilation of statistics on illegal economic activities 
in national accounts and balance of payments, 2018 Edition, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, cit., p. 76. 
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As explained by the OECD, the integration stage can be divided in two sub-levels 
– justification and investment. In the justification point, the money launderer creates a deceptive 
legal origin for the criminal undertakings by fabricating transactions (invoices, bookkeeping, 
reports, contracts, agreements), which can be done e.g. by producing business within the 
sources of income of the owner himself, capital gains and loans, by disguising the ownership 
of assets, and / or by manipulating illicit revenues in businesses with third entities. 
The second investment level within integration phase in the conclusion of the ML 
scheme and provides the welfare means of criminal activities. In this part, cash or electronic 
money may be used for: safekeeping; final consumption purposes in lifestyle, jewellery, 
vehicles, yachts, art, homes; and investing in bank accounts, real estate acquisitions, trade based 
ML, stocks, securities, capital markets, derivatives, receivables, funding of legal and illegal 
business activities.47 
The financial statements can be executed implicitly in the system of national 
accounts and balance of payments management. However, a more in-depth analysis is necessary 
for the most relevant financial flows to tax havens or OFCs, as well as transactional holdings 
of cash to enable businesses associated to illicit goods, services and profits.48 
There is no doubt that in the ML cycle, the more the illegal assets are laundered and 
entangled in the financial system, the farther complex it becomes to feasibly identify their 
origins. As a consequence of the stealthy characteristic of ML, it is problematic to conjecture 
the full amount of global money that goes through the laundry cycle. 
As reported by the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODC), 
the likely sum of internationally money laundered in one year is 2 – 5% of global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), or US$ 800 billion – US$2 trillion of current US dollars, which shows 
that even the lower approximation emphasizes the gravity of the ML phenomenon.49 
 
                                                 
47 OECD (2009), Money Laundering Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax Auditors, OECD 
Publishing, cit., p. 11 and 13-14 
48 European Union (2018), Handbook on the compilation of statistics on illegal economic activities 
in national accounts and balance of payments, 2018 Edition, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, cit., p. 119. 
49 For more numbers and information on ML and globalization, see 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html 
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CHAPTER 2 – GLOBAL TERRORISM FINANCING 
 
Intertwined with the grave concern of money laundering, lies the financing of 
terrorism, which often exploits the exact same gaps for the success of its activities, which is 
why it must be addressed as well. 
Even though not all terrorists – groups and / or individuals – engage on intricate 
financial techniques to manage their assets, it is essential for their purposes to raise a 
considerable amount of capital to supply their actions and transmute strategies into terrorist 
successful achievements. In light of this, methods and techniques of raising funds accompany 
the required advancement of the size, scope and structure of the terrorist organisations.50  
Despite the fact that the amount and variety of terrorists, groups, cells, individuals, 
and related hazards have changed and noticeably augmented in the last decades, the elementary 
requirements and desideratum for terrorists to foster, transfer and expend funds has remained 
equivalent over times. 
The latest terrorist attacks enacted in Paris51 and Brussels52 sadly evinced that 
terrorist occurrences endures to wreak pain and grief in Europe as well as all over the world. 
Within these circumstances, international community must address such danger with plenty 
approaches, specially concerning the funding of these ghastly activities.53 
 
                                                 
50 FATF (2015), Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, FATF, Paris, Retrieved from www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/emerging-terrorist-financing-risks.html 
51 From 7 January 2015 to 9 January 2015, terrorist attacks arose within the Île-de-France region, 
intensely in Paris. 17 people were killed in four shooting attacks (Charlie Hebdo, Fontenay-aux-Roses 
and Montrouge shootings, Dammartin-en-Goële hostage crisis, Hypercacher Kosher Supermarket 
siege), which also resulted in the injure of 22 other people. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed 
responsibility and said that the synchronized outbreaks had been designed for years. After the terrorist 
attacks in Paris in January 2015, the EU decided to strengthen its response and hasten the application of 
approved counteractings. 
52 On 22 March 2016, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for three 
organised suicide bombings struck in Belgium: two at Brussels Airport in Zaventem, and one at 
Maalbeek metro station in central Brussels. 32 people and 3 perpetrators were killed, with more than 
300 people wounded. 
53 Borlini, Leonardo Sergio (2018), Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the 
International Instruments, Oxford University Press, Yearbook of European Law, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 3287423, cit., pp. 553–598. 
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2.2.1. Criminalization of terrorism and its financing 
 
Following September 11 aftermaths, jurisdictions across the world reunited in order 
to underline the links between terrorism, transnational organized crime, international drug 
trafficking and money laundering, calling on countries that had not done so to straightaway 
become parties in the international conferences. In order to establish and delimitate the funding 
of terrorism, it is essential to draw the line of its criminalization and financing throughout a 
timeline. 
It is a well-known fact that terrorists demand funds to coordinate and conduct their 
brutalities – to purchase weapons, supplies to make explosives, travel, as well as effectively 
recruit new operatives, members and supporters. For this reason, investigating the money trail 
is crucial for the mission of depriving terrorists and organisations of the access to the financial 
system and to subsiding its activities, with the aim to identify those involved in the terrorist 
cycle and prevent terrorist attacks from occur in the first place.54 
 
2.2.1.1. Historical and legal background 
 
Since 1963, global community has elaborated various international legal 
instruments to prevent terrorism, that comprises several instruments regarding civil aviation, 
protection of international staff, taking of hostages, nuclear material, maritime navigation, 
explosive materials, terrorist bombings, financing of terrorism and nuclear terrorism.55 
As an immediate response to its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks 
which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, the 
UN Security Council implemented Resolution 1373, imposing specific commitments on 
Member States regarding the prevention and the suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.  
By establishing the illegitimacy of terrorism-related activities as well as of any 
endowment to perpetrate terrorist acts, the UN Security Council determined that one of the main 
                                                 
54 FATF (2018), Financing of Recruitment for Terrorist Purposes, FATF, Paris, Retrieved from 
www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-recruitment-terrorist-
purposes.html 
55 The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism enlists the main 19 universal legal instruments and additional 
amendments dealing with terrorism at http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-instruments.shtml 
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concerns to be addressed should be to obstacle by all means the funding and safe haven of 
terrorists performers, endorsing above all, the imperative need of exchange of information to 
avoid terrorist acts to take place. 
In the same Resolution, the Council also founded the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC), with the mission to oversee the accomplishment of the Resolution determinations.56 
In 1999, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) commenced to focus on 
counter-terrorism issues. In April 2002, by obliging Member States to safeguard their financial 
systems and institutions from individuals planning or engaged in terrorist activities, the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism came into force.57  
After the endorsement of an intensified programme of activities, in 2002, UNODC's 
specialized Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) was assigned to deliver practical aid to Member 
States adhere and apply transnational legal instruments correlated to the prevention and 
suppression of terrorism, specially the aforementioned 1999 UN Convention on this matter. 
In September 2006, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in the form of a Resolution (A/RES/60/288)58 and an Action Plan59 as a 
sui generis global standard to heighten national, regional and international struggles to counter 
terrorism in all its forms, to be reviewed every two years. This enforcement was unique due to 
the fact that it represented the foremost opportunity in which all Member States agreed on a 
joint tactical scheme to fight terrorism, not only by acquiescing that terrorism is absolutely 
                                                 
56 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1373, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th 
meeting, S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001, Retrieved from 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf, Hereinafter UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373. 
57 United Nations, General Assembly, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109, 9 December 
1999, Retrieved from http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm, Hereinafter: 1999 UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
58 United Nations, General Assembly, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Sixtieth session, A/RES/60/288, 8 September 2006, 
Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/288, Hereinafter: 
2006 UN Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
59 The Plan of Action, annexed to the 2006 UN Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, is composed 
by four pillars, which are (i) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (ii) measures 
to prevent and combat terrorism; (iii) measures to build the States’ capacity to prevent and combat 
terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and (iv) measures to 
ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against 
terrorism. 
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intolerable but also by settling hand-on stepladders both individually and collectively to avoid 
and antagonize its practices. 
The implementation of the stratagem accomplished the pledge done by world 
leaders at the 2005 September Summit60, by building elements that were later proposed in the 
2006 Secretary-General Kofi Annan Report, undertitled as ‘Uniting against Terrorism: 
Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy61, to hope for a global effort to fight 
terrorism. In this opportunity, considering terrorist networks surpass national borders, it was 
made clear that enhancing international cooperation is crucial to successfully neutralize terrorist 
activities. 
Bearing in mind that counter terrorism is one of the uppermost priorities for the EU, 
its Member States and its partners, due to its grave consequences on an international basis, the 
European Council adopted an European Agenda on Security for the period 2015-2020, whose 
strategy to fight terrorism globally and make Europe securer, are based on four pillars, which 
are: (i) prevent, (ii) protect, (iii) pursue and (iv) respond.62 
In 2016, the European Council adopted Directive (EU) 2016/681 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution 
of terrorist offences and serious crime63, which, among other measures, establishes a record 
with a 5-year limit on the use of passenger name record data for law enforcement purposes, 
especially counter terrorism, among other definitions64. 
                                                 
60 The 2005 World Summit took place in the city of New York, Washington, D.C, on 14–16 September 
2005. The conference was a follow-up meeting to the United Nations' 2000 Millennium Summit, and 
decisive for the agreement on the UN Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals. 
61 The follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit Uniting against terrorism: recommendations 
for a global counter-terrorism strategy, United Nations, General Assembly, Uniting against terrorism: 
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy, Report of the Secretary-General. Sixtieth 
Session, A/60/825, 27 April 2006, Retrieved from https://undocs.org/A/60/825 
62 The EU counter-terrorism strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting 
humans rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and 
justice, Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05 
REV 4, Brussels, 30 November 2005,  Retrieved from 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=ENandf=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204 
63 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use 
of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 132–149, In force, Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/681/oj 
64 PNR data is personal information that are provided by passengers, collected and held by air carriers. 
It includes information such as the name of the passenger, travel dates, itineraries, seats, baggage, 
contact details and means of payment. 
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2.2.1.2. Defining global terrorism financing 
 
In the counter terrorism financing arena, one of the foremost complexities is 
precisely delineating what is considered, de facto, terrorism. Because of the noteworthy 
political, religious and national repercussions that differ from country to country, not all States 
harmonize on exactly what actions comprise terrorism. 
In light of this, to comprehend clearly the global terrorism financing occurrence, 
first of all it is important to provide a conceptual delineation and a wholesome analysis on its 
legal provisions. 
 
2.2.1.2.1. Conceptual delineation 
 
Even though the majority of nations adopt the 1999 UN International Convention 
for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism definition of terrorism, many countries decided 
not to embrace the international agreement definition.65 
Among its 40-Recommendations assessment, the FATF66 specifies under Section 
C, four specific guidelines regarding terrorist funding and the financing of proliferation. In this 
evaluation, the 5th Recommendation on terrorist financing offence states what is considered a 
terrorist financing offence, pressing that “countries should criminalise terrorist financing on the 
basis of the Terrorist Financing Convention, and should criminalise not only the financing of 
terrorist acts but also the financing of terrorist organisations and individual terrorists even in 
                                                 
65 Schott, Paul Allan (2006), Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank/The International Monetary Fund, Retrieved 
from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-
1146581427871/Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf 
66 As it will be further elucidated in the topic 2.3.1. Financial Action Task Force outcomes, the FATF is 
an inter-governmental body leading the global effort in AML and CFT arena. The FATF 
Recommendations, for its part, are known as the international standards for combating money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
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the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act or acts. Countries should ensure that such offences 
are designated as money laundering predicate offences.”67 
Towards this end, the inter-governmental body establishes international standards 
steering financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing (Recommendation 6); 
financial sanctions related to proliferation (Recommendation 7); and non-profit organisations 
(Recommendation 8).68 
On these grounds, the FATF also chose not to explicitly define the meaning of 
funding terrorism in its 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing69, but urges 
countries to ratify and implement the 1999 UN International Convention for Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism as well as other UN resolutions regarding avoidance and suppression 
of the financing of terrorist acts, principally the UN Security Council Resolution 1373.70 
For the IMF, terrorism financing can be defined as the procedure endured to foster 
money in order to provide funding of terrorist activities, which involves the solicitation, 
collection or provision of resources with the intention that they may be used to sustain terrorist 
acts or entities. Under the Fund’s view, assets can be from both legal and illicit sources and the 
chief objective of persons or organisations tangled in the supporting of terrorism is, hence, not 
                                                 
67 FATF (2012-2018), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism and Proliferation, FATF, Paris, France, Retrieved from www.fatf-
gafi.org/recommendations.html, Hereinafter: FATF Recommendations. 
68 FATF Recommendations, cit. 
69 The FATF developed nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing following the events of 
2001 September 11, that conjoined with the FATF Recommendations on ML, establish the main 
framework to detect, counteract and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts. See further in 
FATF (2001-2008), FATF IX Special Recommendations, FATF, Paris, Retrieved from https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-
%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf, Hereinafter: FATF 9 Special 
Recommendations. 
70 Among the FATF 9 Special Recommendations, according to the 1st FATF Special Recommendation, 
“Each country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully the 1999 United Nations 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Countries should also 
immediately implement the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the 
financing of terrorist acts, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.” In the 5th 
Recommendation of the international standards on combating money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism and proliferation, the FATF also reinforce this endorsement, by stating that “Countries should 
criminalise terrorist financing on the basis of the Terrorist Financing Convention, and should 
criminalise not only the financing of terrorist acts but also the financing of terrorist organisations and 
individual terrorists even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act or acts.” In FATF 9 Special 
Recommendations, cit. 
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essentially to disguise the origin of the revenues, but first to camouflage both the funding and 
the nature of the financed endeavour.71 
 
2.2.1.2.2. Legal provisions 
 
Succeeding the first-hand arrangements established by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, 
terrorism was included alongside money laundering and other offences in the ‘Euro-crimes’ 
category specified in Article 83(1)72 of the TFEU. 
The most imperative and widespread legal definition of Global Terrorist Financing 
was moulded in the 1999 UN International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, which is adopted by the main majority countries for purposes of defining terrorist 
financing. In conformity with Article 2(1) of this worldwide Instrument, “Any person commits 
an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or 
indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should 
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a) 
An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties 
listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any 
act.”73 
At the EU level, in conformity with Article 1(4) of the Third AML / CFT Directive 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
                                                 
71 International Monetary Fund (2018), The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism, Communications Department, Washington, D.C: IMF, cit. 
72 Article 83(1) TFEU (ex Article 31 TEU) states that “The European Parliament and the Council may, 
by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish 
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly 
serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or 
from a special need to combat them on a common basis. These areas of crime are the following: 
terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, 
computer crime and organised crime. On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a 
decision identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.” 
73 1999 UN International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, cit. 
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terrorist financing, the term ‘terrorist financing’ signifies “the provision or collection of funds, 
by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the offences 
within the meaning of Articles 1 to 474 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 
June 200275 on combating terrorism.”  
 
2.2.1.3. Methods of terrorism financing 
 
Frequently, the practices that are used to launder money are essentially the same as 
those used to conceal the funding and performing of terrorist activities. As mentioned above, 
the revenues that are used to finance terrorism may derive from criminal activities or even 
legitimate causes, namely donations or gifts of cash or other assets to organisations, such as 
foundations or charities, for instance. 
Regardless of whether the legitimate or illicit origin, it is decisive to conceal that 
these assets are being used for terrorist activities, which by the 1999 UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism adoption obligations has become 
in most countries absolutely prohibited, and for this reason, demands to surpass undetected. 
Also, under the terrorist’s perspective, disguising the origin is important to make it available 
for future funding purposes.  
Counter terrorist financing also encompasses deliberation of what procedures 
should be taken to impede the use of entities by money launderers and terrorists, comprising, 
                                                 
74 Articles 1 to 4 specifies Terrorist offences and fundamental rights and principles (art. 1), offences 
relating to a terrorist group (art. 2), offences linked to terrorist activities (art. 3), inciting, aiding or 
abetting, and attempting terrorist offences (art. 4). In the following Articles, the aforementioned 3rd AML 
/ CFT Directive establishes penalties (art. 5), particular circumstances (art. 6), liability of legal persons 
(art. 7), penalties for legal persons (art. 8), Jurisdiction and prosecution regarding terrorism activities 
and consequences (art. 9), protection of, and assistance to, victims (art. 10), Implementation and reports 
(art. 11) and finally, territorial application to include Gibraltar (art. 12). 
75 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3–7, 
No longer In force, Date of end of validity: 19/04/2017; Repealed and replaced by Directive (EU) 
2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017, Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2002/475/oj 
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for example, the scrutiny of unusual types of money transmission76 or transmittal systems77. At 
the same time, it is important to notice that terrorist funding derived from illegal origins may 
already be covered by each national AML framework, hinging upon the range of predicate 
misdemeanours.78 
 
2.2.1.3.1. Main TF practices 
 
In a comprehensive overview, it is possible to delineate the main revenue sources 
from which terrorists organisations raise funds to sustain their activities. According to the US 
Department os Treasury79, nearly 33% of terrorist financing implicate private donations as an 
undeviating financial provision from individuals to terrorist networks. Wealthy private donors 
can be an important source of income for some terrorist groups. For instance, the FATF ISIL 
Report points out that ISIL has received considerable resources from prosperous private 
benefactors in the region.80 
Another common practice reported is through the abuse of Non-Profit 
Organisations or Institutions81 (NPOs / NPIs), which is carried out by five underlying 
                                                 
76 According to the FATF 9 Special Recommendations, Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation 
VI: Alternative Remittance, the term “Money or value transfer service refers to a financial service that 
accepts cash, cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value in one location and pays a 
corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary in another location by means of a 
communication, message, transfer or through a clearing network to which the money/value transfer 
service belongs. Transactions performed by such services can involve one or more intermediaries and 
a third-party final payment.” 
77 According to the FATF 9 Special Recommendations, Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation 
VI: Alternative Remittance informal systems are recurrently indicated to as substitute remittance 
facilities or concealed (or parallel) banking systems in selected countries, for most times these systems 
are linked to specific geographic areas and are thus designated using its particular terms which examples 
include the systems hawala, hundi, fei-chien, and the black market peso exchange. For more information 
on Hawala and other remittance systems, see International Monetary Fund (2005), Regulatory 
Frameworks for Hawala and Other Remittance Systems, Washington, D.C: IMF Publication Services. 
78 Schott, Paul Allan (2006), Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank/The International Monetary Fund, cit. 
79 United States of America, Department of Treasury, National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, 
Washington, 2015, Retrieved from https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2018ntfra_12182018.pdf 
80 FATF (2015), Financing of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
FATF, Paris, Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-
terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf 
81 Under the OECD definition in OECD (2008), OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Fourth Edition, OECD Publishing, cit., p. 239, NPIs are “are legal or social entities, created 
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behaviours: (i) deviation of contributions through associated individuals to terrorist 
organisations; (ii) corruption of some NPO authorities in behalf of a terrorist organisation; (iii) 
misuse of program delivery to fund the terrorist organisation; (iv) sustenance for recruitment 
into terrorist organisations and (v) the design of ‘false representation and bogus NPOs’ through 
falsification / fraud. 
As revealed earlier, terrorist organisations may also use as funding asset the 
proceeds of criminal activities, by engaging in a multiplicity of illegal undertakings to produce 
funds, such as identity thefts to raise finances via credit card fraud, insurance and loan fraud, 
smuggling of goods, including cigarettes, tax fraud, bank robberies, drug trafficking networks, 
among many others.  
Understood as a common method of terrorist funding is the reverse money-
laundering practice, where money from legal sources is used to serve a terrorist purpose: instead 
of using profits of criminality to camouflage them and reduce detection probabilities, genuine 
resources are employed for illegal activity to avoid taxation. Motivations for the use of reverse 
money laundering may include tax avoidance, bribery, and any form of cutting corners when it 
comes to following the rules in the business world, as well as other criminal deeds. Because 
legitimate funds are used for reverse money laundering, it can mean it's much more difficult to 
monitor, detect, and prevent it than straightforward money laundering.82 
Comprised as terrorist funding techniques are also the extortion of local and 
diaspora populations, businesses and executing kidnapping for ransom. Over times, smaller 
terrorists’ attacks funds are fostered by individual terrorists and their backing linkages depleting 
reserves, access to credit or businesses earnings underneath their power, such as legitimate 
commercial enterprises. Repeatedly, certain terrorist organisations have been financially 
supported even by national governments sponsorship. 
Amidst emerging terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities, virtual currencies 
have risen as the main method of international movements of assets, attracting the attention of 
assorted criminal groups, especially terrorist individuals and groups as a widespread adoption 
in the crime landscape. 
                                                 
for the purpose of producing goods and services, whose status does not permit them to be a source of 
income, profit, or other financial gain for the units that establish, control, or finance them.” 
82 Krieger, Tim and Meierrieks, Daniel (2011), Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering, Retrieved 
from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860069 
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By providing anonymity for both operators and transactions, virtual currencies 
deliver free movement of illegal incomes briefly from one country to another, thus offering 
higher consistency as well as low volatility and exchange risks. Prepaid cards, electronic 
payments, internet-based payment services, and social media fundraising also appear as 
innovative forms of TF. 
Lastly, the key mechanisms expended to move terrorist assets comprises the use of 
potentially vulnerable financial institutions that facilitate illicit fund transfers, which are mainly 
carried out through banks, money value transfer systems and physical transportation of cash. 
In this assessment, the banking system is an appealing system for terrorists that seek 
to move funds globally by reason of the readiness and speed of transactions within the 
international financial network, especially regarding those made available in offshore 
jurisdictions, as it will be better explored below.83 
 
CHAPTER 3 – AML / CFT COMPLIANCE ARCHITECTURE 
 
In a thorough outline regarding Anti‐Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML / CFT) comprehensive legislative framework, it is possible to 
delineate three main distinctive periods: (i) a national, monitoring and precautionary approach 
in the early 1970s; (ii) an international criminalization in the latter 80’s with the 1988 UN Drugs 
Convention; and (iii) a supra-nationalization phase with the establishment of the FATF in 1989, 
with the aim to internationally improve and standardize AML / CFT measures, especially 
through its Recommendations package84, as it will be further evaluated on the present study. 
 
2.3.1. Financial Action Task Force outcomes 
 
Currently, the international body leading the global effort in AML and CFT arena 
is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental organisation first established 
                                                 
83 FATF (2015), Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, FATF, Paris, cit.  
84 Borlini, Leonardo Sergio (2018), Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the 
International Instruments, Oxford University Press, Yearbook of European Law, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 3287423, cit., pp. 553–598. 
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in 1989 by the European Commission, the G7 Member States85 and eight other countries86 in 
an exertion to tackle the growing money laundering hazard, terrorist financing and potential 
vulnerabilities of the international financial arrangement.87  
Presently comprehending thirty-six members jurisdictions and two regional 
organisations88, the FATF represents the major part of worldwide financial centres, imbedding 
also nine associate members89 and twenty-three other observer organisations, including the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations, among others.90 
                                                 
85 The Group of Seven (G7) is a group consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
86 During 1991 and 1992, the FATF expanded its membership from the original 16 to 28 members. In 
2000 the organisation expanded to 31 members and is formed by 38 members at present. The current 
member jurisdictions that form the FATF are: Argentina; Australia; Austria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; 
China; Denmark; European Commission; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Gulf Co-operation 
Council; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; India; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Republic of Korea; 
Luxembourg; Malaysia; Mexico; Netherlands, Kingdom of; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Russian 
Federation; Singapore; South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United Kingdom; United 
States. 
87 See further at the FATF official site http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
88 The FATF regional organisations are Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. 
89 The FATF associate members are: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG); Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF); Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL); Eurasian Group 
(EAG); Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG); Financial Action 
Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT) formerly known as Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering in South America (GAFISUD); Inter Governmental Action Group against Money 
Laundering in West Africa (GIABA); Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
(MENAFATF); and Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC). 
90 The international organisations that have an observer status at the FATF are the African Development 
Bank; Anti-Money Laundering Liaison Committee of the Franc Zone (CLAB); Asian Development 
Bank; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS); Camden Asset Recovery Inter-agency 
Network (CARIN); Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD); European Central Bank (ECB); Eurojust; Europol; Group of International 
Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS) [formerly the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors - OGBS]; 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS); 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Organisation of; Securities Commissions (IOSCO); 
Interpol; Organisation of American States / Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism 
(OAS/CICTE); Organisation of American States / Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(OAS/CICAD); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); United Nations - United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), 
The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526(2004) and 
2253(2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; 
The Expert Group to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), 
Panel of Experts to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), 
Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch; World Bank and the World Customs Organisation (WCO). 
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The FATF decides its core resolutions through its head-Plenary, which assemblies 
takes place three times per year. 
The main resolution of the FATF is to guarantee that AML / CFT compliance 
measures are effectively met, as well as other liabilities regarding the integrity of the banking 
system and financial institutions in cooperation with other international stakeholders. 
In order to achieve those objectives, the FATF issued a series of universal, 
coordinated and up-to-date Recommendations91 that are known as the international standards 
for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, including the spread of 
weaponries categorized as mass destruction and other perils concerning the international 
financing system. 
Although the Recommendations comprise a non-law enforced mechanism in a 
particular instance of soft law, bearing in mind the FATF has been endorsed as a worldwide 
guidance for AML / CFT standards, this instrument has took an utmost mandatory aspect, 
especially considering the possible loss of membership status and eventual sanctions resulting 
from not applying the recommendations. For this reason, in the AML arena, there is a peculiar 
interface within soft and hard law, since one depends to the another on a persistent bolstering 
basis.92  
Amidst the Recommendations compendium93, are several AML / CFT policies and 
risk evaluations, which involves assessing menaces and applying a risk-based approach (RBA), 
based on a high-level of international cooperation and coordination arrangement between the 
financial intelligence units (FIU), law enforcement authorities, and other relevant competent 
authorities 94. 
                                                 
91 First settled in 1990, as an initiative to fight the financial systems misapplication by drug money 
launderers, the Recommendations were then revised in 1996 to widen their extent and reflect the 
increasing money laundering developments and practices. Further the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001 the 
FATF broaden its mandate to embrace the funding of terrorism issue, by also creating the Eight (which 
later became Nine) Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. The Recommendations were 
reviewed a second time in 2003 and most recently on 16 February 2012 to guarantee that they remain 
efficient and pertinent. Conjointly with the Special Recommendations, the Recommendations have been 
recognized by over 180 countries as the international standard for AML and CFT. 
92 Borlini, Leonardo Sergio (2018), Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the 
International Instruments, Oxford University Press, Yearbook of European Law, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 3287423, cit., pp. 553–598. 
93 FATF Recommendations, cit. 
94 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 1 and 2. 
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In a preventive measure assessment, by establishing limits to financial institutions 
secrecy laws95, the proposed measures entails that financial institutions ought to provide 
constant surveillance by customer due diligence (CDD) measures96, five year record-keeping 
transactions97, politically exposed persons (PEP) investigations98, immediately report of 
suspicious activities99 and guarantee transparency through identification of legal persons and 
entities beneficial ownership100. 
As to ensure the objectives are achieved, the Recommendations endure countries 
and jurisdictions to establish sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative applicable to 
entities and individuals who disrupt the regulatory and legal standards101. 
In order to promote transparency, one of the main fronts of the joint assignment is 
to promote international cooperation, to be assured by worldwide instruments and mutual legal 
assistance102, and even deliver prompt extraditable offences regarding money laundering and 
terrorist financing, upon request.103 
The Recommendations archetypal design a model that comprises at the same time 
criminalization of money laundering and terrorist financing as well as measures devised to 
avoid earnings of unlawful activities from entering into the financial system as legitimate 
sources. This standard has been adopted by the AML / CFT legislation of most countries as 
well as the EU framework achievements, as it will be seen below.104 
 
2.3.2. AML / CFT comprehensive legislative framework 
 
Considering all countries and jurisdictions have different legislations and distinct 
techniques for combating money laundering, terrorist funding, and other financial crime related 
                                                 
95 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 9. 
96 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 10. 
97 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 11. 
98 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 12. 
99 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 20. 
100 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 24 and 25. 
101 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 35. 
102 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 36, 37 and 38. 
103 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 39. 
104 Borlini, Leonardo Sergio (2018), Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the 
International Instruments, Oxford University Press, Yearbook of European Law, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 3287423, cit., pp. 553–598. 
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matters, the FATF supervises the progress of its members globally, nonetheless it is up to each 
country to implement effective actions to ensure their national systems complies with the agreed 
standards. At the EU level, those benchmarks were objective of Council Directives addressed 
to Member States that must be incorporated in its internal legislation in a tight schedule. 
 
2.3.2.1. AML / CFT Directives 
 
Amongst the most prominent AML / CFT legislations achievements, are the 
Directives adopted at the European Level, which have been continuously following the works 
carried out by the FATF and other international bodies and organisations, specially the OECD. 
 
2.3.2.1.1. Previous achievements 
 
The First AML Directive105 was adopted in June 1991 by the Council of the EU 
with the aim to harmonize legislative framework within its Member States regarding its Single 
Market106, imbedding customer identification measures, 5-year record-keeping and important 
coverage techniques of suspicious transactions.107 The 1st AML Directive established a two year 
maximum limit to Member States incorporate laws, regulations and administrative decisions 
necessary to comply with the sanctioned Directive.108 
A decade later, addressing the FATF remodulation perpetrated works, the Second 
AML Directive was adopted, incorporating not only a stricter AML agenda, but also broadening 
its definition and other underlying violations within its range. 
                                                 
105 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purpose of money laundering, OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p. 77–82, No longer in force, Date of end of 
validity: 14/12/2005; Repealed by Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 October 2005, Retrieved from http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/308/oj, Hereinafter: First AML 
Directive. 
106 According to the European Commission, “The Single Market refers to the EU as one territory without 
any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods and services.” For 
further information on the Single Market, see https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en 
107 These changes incorporated the FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 10, 11 and 20, with respectively 
correspondence in Articles 3, 4 and 7 of the 1st AML Directive. 
108 Article 16 of the 1st AML Directive. 
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Diligently pursuing the FATF programmes, in 2006, the Third AML / CFT 
Directive came into picture, extending the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering also to terrorist funding. 
Additionally, this Directive introduced the risk-based-approach (RBA) advised on 
the FATF Recommendations 1 and 2, as well as reformulated the customer due diligence 
assessment, consolidated in to the ‘know your customer’ or ‘know your client’ (KYC) 
procedure109 and politically exposed persons (PEPs) investigations110 model. 
Amidst other changes, the Directive also interleaved reporting obligations with the 
creation of central national units – designated as international financial intelligence units (FIUs) 
111 – in an effort to improve international cooperation to effectively and jointly combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing.112 
In May 2015, the Fourth Directive to address the threat of money laundering and 
terrorist financing came into force, introducing the concern with the increasingly use of 
electronic money products as a substitute for bank accounts, which can lead to the misuse of 
the financial system, thus subjecting those products to AML / CFT obligations113. 
By setting out a resourceful and wide-ranging legal framework, the 4th Directive 
addressed ML and TF problems by entailing Member States to detect, comprehend and alleviate 
risks related to criminal activities. 
The 4th AML / CFT Directive deadline for the Member States transposition 
occurred on 26 June 2017 and constituted the leading instrument in advancing measures to 
avoid the exploit of the financial system at the Union level for money laundering and terrorist 
funding purposes. 
 
                                                 
109 This change incorporated the FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 12, which are referred in Articles 3 
and 13 of the 3rd AML / CFT Directive. 
110 Chapter II of the 3rd AML / CFT Directive. 
111 Article 21 of the 3rd AML / CFT Directive. 
112 According to Article 21(2) of the 3rd AML / CFT Directive, the FIUs shall be responsible for receiving 
(and to the extent permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, 
disclosures of information which concern potential money laundering, potential terrorist financing or 
are required by national legislation or regulation and shall be provided with adequate resources in order 
to fulfil its tasks. 
113 Article 12 of the 4th AML / CFT Directive. 
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2.3.2.1.2. The 5th EU AML / CFT Directive 
 
The Fifth EU AML / CFT Directive114 was published in June 2018, enacting a series 
of amendments to the 4th AML / CFT Directive, Directives 2009/138/EC115 and 2013/36/EU116 
and in reaction to the recent terrorist events that lamentably took place in Paris and Brussels.117 
The 5th AML, in this sense, has brought ground-breaking amendments to the Union 
framework, introducing strategies to regulate and fight prospective vulnerabilities of the new 
virtual era. Considering that cryptocurrencies are recurrently used for money laundering and 
terrorism financing resolutions118, the 5th AML / CFT Directive alludes to potential hazards 
permitted by the anonymity of virtual currencies for financial crimes119, unlawful purposes120 
and demands Member States to guarantee a more effective and force-combined approach when 
undertaking financial investigations regarding terrorism, comprising those associated to the 
unauthorized use of virtual currencies.121 
                                                 
114 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, 
PE/72/2017/REV/1, OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43–74, In force, Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/843/oj, Hereinafter: 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
115 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (Text with EEA 
relevance), OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1–155, In force, Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/138/oj 
116 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with 
EEA relevance, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338–436, In force, Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj 
117 Recital (2) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive makes explicit reference to the aforementioned terrorist 
attacks, by stating that “Recent terrorist attacks have brought to light emerging new trends, in particular 
regarding the way terrorist groups finance and conduct their operations.” As reported by the European 
Parliament site information, in recent years there has been an increase in terrorist threats and attacks, 
beginning in 2015 with the killings at the Charlie Hebdo magazine office in Paris. 
118 FATF (2018), FATF Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, FATF, Paris, 
France, Retrieved from https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/report-g20-fm-
cbg-july-2018.html 
119 As in Marian, Omri Y. (2013), Are Cryptocurrencies 'Super' Tax Havens? Michigan Law Review 
First Impressions 38, Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2305863, cryptocurrencies “could 
replace tax havens as the weapon-of-choice for tax-evaders” 
120 Recital (9) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
121 Recital (16) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
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Within its array of enhancements, the 5th AML / CFT Directive introduces the 
concept of virtual currencies122 and custodian wallet provider123, which head the main 
innovation in this trailblazing legislation. As specified by the new Directive regulation, 
cryptocurrencies exchanges are therefore envisaged as legal-binding entities, in an attempt to 
categorize these computer-generated transactions under the same AML / CFT parameters 
already applied to other financial institutions enumerated on the 4th AML / CFT Directive. In a 
practical matter, this implicates an obligation to perform customer due diligence (CDD), and 
also mandatory submission of periodic suspicious activity reports. 
The 5th AML / CFT Directive also delivers critical improvements regarding the role 
of FIUs, which will be better explicated below124. The pioneering Directive sets out in addition 
a well-organized and far-reaching legal scaffold for tackling the gathering of assets and funds 
for terrorist purposes, in an exertion for Member States to detect, comprehend and alleviate the 
jeopardies related to money laundering and terrorist financing.125 
Another turning point provided by this innovative regulation is that now, 
transparency has become the norm: registers of beneficial ownership information previously 
built under the 4th AML / CFT Directive must be made available to the general public, which 
means that beneficial ownership information is now to be grant to any natural or legal person 
that may demonstrate a legitimate interest as well as to any person that fills a request related to 
a trust or similar legal organisation that holds or controls any business or other legal person.  
The extent of the information now must comprise, as a minimum: (i) the beneficial 
owner’s month and year of birth; (ii) country of residence; (iii) nationality; and (iv) the nature 
and extent of the beneficial interest held.126 
Under the 5th AML / CFT Directive also anonymous bank accounts, savings 
accounts or safe deposit boxes shall be obliterated. For these tenacities, Member States shall 
produce central electronic data retrieval systems by latest 10 September 2020, as a means to 
                                                 
122 Under the new 5th AML / CFT Directive, virtual currencies are not to be confused with electronic 
money, and are defined as a “a digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a 
central bank or a public authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does 
not possess a legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means 
of exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically”.  
123 As outlined by the 5th AML / CFT Directive, “custodian wallet provider means an entity that provides 
services to safeguard private cryptographic keys on behalf of its customers, to hold, store and transfer 
virtual currencies.” 
124 See topic 4.3.1.2. Financial Intelligence Units Role. 
125 Recital (1) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
126 Article 1(15)(c) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
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provide suitable rapport of any natural or legal person that holds or controls such accounts, 
which data will be unswervingly reachable by FIUs and national competent authorities.127 
Member States are urged to integrate the new regulations adjustments in their domestic 
framework by latest January 20th, 2020128. 
 
PART III 
OFFSHORE JURISDICTIONS 
 
CHAPTER 1 – AN OFFSHORE ASSESSMENT 
 
Throughout times, offshore activities became more sophisticated – often leveraging 
informal value transfer systems to keep money out of the hands of tax collectors. Tax havens 
or low-tax jurisdictions create place to elope taxation in a weak regulation environment by 
offering a low or zero tax levy, non-genuine residency and confidentiality, thus, opening gaps 
as well to criminal endeavours. Some EU countries – for instance Estonia, Latvia, Malta and 
Cyprus – have conceivably built their economies by inviting foreign incomes, oftentimes 
without effectively monitoring the origin of that cash – thus the problem of OFCs roles in the 
financial system. 
 
3.1.1. Financial scandals 
 
Following the broke of the Luxembourg Leaks129 by the International Consortium 
of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)130 in 2014, the world turned its attention to aggressive tax 
                                                 
127 Article 1(42) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
128 Article 4 of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
129 The Luxembourg Leaks, also known as the Lux Leaks, is the financial scandal that was exposed by 
the ICIJ in November 2014, that revealed PricewaterhouseCoopers had obtained at least 548 tax rulings 
in Luxembourg from 2002 to 2010 designed to create drastic tax reductions for several multinational 
companies, among them Pepsi, IKEA, AIG, Coach, Deutsche Bank, Abbott Laboratories and nearly 
other 340 other companies. See further at https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks/ 
130 Instituted in 1997, the ICIJ is an international network comprising more than 200 investigative 
journalists in 70 countries who participate uncovering facts and stories on a cooperative basis 
environment. For more information on the ICIJ, see: https://www.icij.org/ 
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planning operations, which were being carried out by taxpayers, with the objective of avoiding 
paying taxes and maximizing profits131, frequently in an absolutely legal, but immoral way132. 
This is because tax evasion and avoidance are aimed at reducing or minimizing tax liability, but 
while tax avoidance is legal, tax evasion is illegal.133 
This event was succeeded by the Swiss Leaks134, in February 2015; by the Panama 
Papers135 in April 2016; and more recently by the Paradise Papers136 in October 2017, 
highlighting the improvement of strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in fiscal rules to 
promote the artificial relocation of profits to offshores and avoid paying taxes, generating the 
loss of billions of dollars to jurisdictions. 
Such circumstances have raised worldwide outrage and concern about the negative 
effects of the process of financial globalization, which has led to the amplification of markets, 
but at the cost of opening loopholes for large-scale tax misdemeanours and also criminal 
endeavours137.  
                                                 
131 Huesecken, Birgit and Overesch, Michael (2015), Tax Avoidance through Advance Tax Rulings – 
Evidence from the LuxLeaks Firms, Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2664631 
132 Dourado, Ana Paula (2017), Governação Fiscal Global, Coimbra: Almedina, p. 43. 
133 Prebble, Zoë M. and Prebble QC, John (2010), The Morality of Tax Avoidance, Creighton Law 
Review, Vol. 43, No. 3, Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 9/2012, pp. 693-
745, Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=1650363 
134 Swiss Leaks is a collective investigation driven by the ICIJ, with more than 140 journalists in 45 
nations to scrutinize 60,000 leaked files. The documents disclosed how the Swiss branch of HSBC, one 
of the world’s chief banking groups, has benefitted from doing business with tax evaders and criminals 
in a global scale, with explicit details of how the bank was aware of wrongdoing by some clients, 
amounting a total value held in the bank accounts that at the time exceeded US$100 billion. More 
information at: https://www.icij.org/investigations/swiss-leaks/ 
135 As an unprecedented investigation, the Panama Papers revealed offshore connections of some of the 
world’s most noticeable figures. In a joint effort with the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, the 
ICIJ and more than a 100 other media partners expended near a year filtering 11.5 million leaked files 
to depict offshore holdings of world political leaders, drug traffickers, billionaires, celebrities and sports 
stars associating to global scandals. The scandal also published the names and addresses of the owners 
of all the shell companies crafted by the Panamanian firm Mossack-Fonseca, at the time a major provider 
of offshore financial services for two decades along. For more information, see: 
https://panamapapers.icij.org/ 
136 The Paradise Papers is a global inquiry into the offshore activities of some of the world’s most 
influential persons and companies, conducted by the ICIJ and other 95 media partners that surveyed 
13.4 million leaked files from an arrangement of offshore service providers and company archives on 
many other offshores jurisdictions. As in the Panama Papers leaks, the files were also attained by the 
German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung. For more information see: 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ 
137 Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2014), Reforming Taxation to Promote Growth and Equity, Roosevelt Institute, 
White Paper, Retrieved from: http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Stiglitz_Reforming_Taxation_White_Paper_Roosevelt_Institute.pdf 
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In response to the Panama Papers leaks, the European Parliament agreed to create 
the Policy Department on Economic and Scientific Policies for the Committee on Money 
Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, named simply after the PANA committee138 in 
June 2016, with the aim to promote an investigation on such claimed infringements and 
misapplication of Union law regarding ML, tax avoidance and tax evasion matters. 
The works carried out by the Committee disclosed that the exposé of the Panama 
Papers was not just a coincidence: individuals and legal entities were clearly abusing offshore 
structures in order to hide from due taxation or being prosecuted by tax authorities. 
The Committee clinched that the amount of tax revenue lost to national authorities 
in the EU because of the schemes highlighted in the Panama Papers used by individuals was 
estimated to be between EUR 109 billion and EUR 237 billion in 2015 with a midpoint of EUR 
173 billion.139 
The activities of the Committee were concluded and adopted by plenary vote on 13 
December 2017, with the implementation of political recommendations to the Commission and 
Council in the city of Strasbourg, France.140 
 
3.1.2. OFCs and tax havens – a historical development  
 
From the considerations driven above, offshore jurisdictions possess a negative 
association and are undoubtedly related to tax avoidance, which is considered to be as old as 
taxation itself. In this sense, it is possible to drive a historically divergence between OFCs and 
                                                 
138 Unger, Brigitte and Verbeken, Dirk (2017), Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings 
and challenges, Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific 
Policy, EU: European Parliament, cit. 
139 European Parliament (2017), The Impact of Schemes revealed by the Panama Papers on the Economy 
and Finances of a Sample of Member States, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department D: Budgetary Affairs, Authors: Blomeyer and Sanz et al, Brussels: European Union, PE 
572.717, Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/572717/IPOL_STU(2017)572717_EN.pd
f 
140 More information on the European Parliament’s ‘Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged 
contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, 
tax avoidance and tax evasion’ (PANA committee), Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/pana/home.html 
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tax havens: the latter are considered to be in existence since early 20th century141 while OFCs 
are inferred in a much more recent perspective, nearby the 1960s142. 
According to studies, the upsurge of tax havens can be traced back to the creating 
of the virtual residency concept, by the British courts in 1929. In the case of Egyptian Delta 
Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V. Todd143, although the company was registered in London, it 
didn’t truly have any activities in the United Kingdom, and consequently could not be subject 
to British taxation. As explained by Picciotto144, it was created a “a loophole which in a sense 
made Britain a tax haven”. 
Since its earliest referrals in history, tax havens have been used as a frequently 
arrangement to safeguard undertakings by moving the money abroad to escape tax incidence.145 
Offshore locations have been otherwise specifically chosen by companies and individuals as a 
means to conceal their activities far from their own jurisdiction, and it is precisely this aspect 
that has drawn criminals ever since146. 
In 1934, fretted with the 1929 Depression that brought the bankrupt of numerous 
worldwide corporations and specially concerned with the Austrian and German neighbours 
                                                 
141 Palan, Ronen; Murphy, Richard, and Chavagneux, Christian (2010), Tax Havens: How 
Globalizations Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, cit. 
142 International Monetary Fund (2007), Concept of offshore financial centres: In search of an 
operational definition, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets 
Dept, Prepared by Zoromé, Ahmed, p. 4, Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0787.pdf 
143 Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Todd, (1929), 14 T.C. 119 
144 Picciotto, Sol (1992), International Business Taxation, A Study in the Internationalization of Business 
Regulation, London: Cambridge University Press, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Retrieved from 
https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Picciotto%201992%20International%20Business%20Taxat
ion.pdf 
145 As stated by Picciotto, Sol (1999), Offshore: The State as Legal Fiction, Offshore Finance Centres 
and Tax Havens, Edited by Mark p. Hampton and Jason P. Abbott, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 
43-79, in the 1920s, prosperous British, Canadian and north-American citizens have produced offshore 
trusts and holding corporations in the Bahamas and the Channel Islands to shield their wealth from due 
taxation. 
146 As before mentioned in the chapter regarding the historical and legal background of money 
laundering (see topic 2.1.1.1. Historical and legal background), first offshore activities too refer to 1920s 
Al Capone accomplishments and other criminals that, during the American alcohol prohibition period 
of 1920-1933, drove their illegal profits outside their home state borders in order to shelter them from 
law enforcement, particularly in USA States of New Jersey and Delaware, known as first to use the 
practice of attracting non-resident companies by delivering favourable regulatory contexts. 
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fates, Switzerland147 approved its Banking Act148 that in Article 47149, provided shelter to the 
Swiss banking system by reinforcing its confidentiality ‘obligation’ and placing it under the 
protection of the Penal Code, in spite of any national administration, including Switzerland 
itself150. 
By ensuring that once passed the borders, assets would enter an uninfringeable legal 
protection safeguarded by criminal law and supported by national enforcement, along with US 
State laws and British virtual residency-concept, Swiss bank secrecy became the third column 
of the tax haven basis.151 Although the Bank Secrecy Act has been seven times successively 
amended since its first adoption in 1934, the high penalties for confidential information 
disclosure remain unaltered.  
Following these developments, a few small nations driven by Switzerland began to 
provide tax havens, such as the small principality of Liechtenstein, located between Switzerland 
and Austria. Studies imply that a Zurich-Zug-Liechtenstein triangle materialized as the first true 
European tax haven hub during the 1920s. Luxembourg as well was amid the primary countries 
to support holding companies152 activities. Further to this, evidence shows that Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, Jersey and Panama also served as tax havens during the 2nd interwar phase.153 
                                                 
147 Switzerland is considered by most as the grandfather of the world’s tax havens, one of the world’s 
largest offshore financial centres, and one of the world’s biggest secrecy jurisdictions or tax havens. 
148 Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen (Bankengesetz, BankG) vom 8. November 1934 
(Stand am 1. Januar 2019) available in German, French and Italian at 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19340083/index.html#. Unofficial translation 
Retrieved from https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ch/pdf/ch-banking-act-en.pdf 
149 Article 47 of the Bank Secrecy Act makes it a federal crime to disclose the information or activity of 
clients banking domestically to foreign entities, third parties, or even Swiss authorities without either a) 
consent or b) an accepted criminal complaint. In Switzerland, Swiss banking law prohibits banks from 
transmitting information about their clients to a third person. In legal terms, banking secrecy is 
considered a professional secrecy obligation and eventual violation of the bank secrecy is punished with 
at least 3 years of prison and by fines of 250.000 Swiss francs minimum. 
150 Banking secrecy and bank-client confidentiality was a traditional and a civil offense in Switzerland 
since the 1770s. 
151 Palan, Ronen; Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux (2010), Tax havens: how globalization 
really works, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, cit. 
152 Under the OECD definition in OECD (2008), OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Fourth Edition, OECD Publishing, cit., p. 236, a holding company is “a company established 
to hold participation interests in other enterprises on behalf of its owner. Some holding companies may 
have a substantial physical presence as evidenced by, for example, office buildings, equipment, and 
employees. Others may have little or no physical presence and may exist only as shell companies.” 
153 Palan, Ronen, Murphy, Richard, and Chavagneux, Christian (2010), Tax Havens: How 
Globalizations Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, cit. 
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Tax havens proved sequentially much of valuable after World War II and were 
recurrently used in order to enable occupied zones such as Germany and Austria to do business 
overseas.154 
In 1975, with the oil shock, new arrangements of offshore centres raised to dodge 
US and European framework context, providing growth of ways of escaping national 
regulations. With this enactment, the Central Bank lost track and count of economic 
transactions that were being carried out by corporations thus beginning the financial 
liberalization era in 1980s.155  
From this period on, tax havens have proliferated and modernized extensively all 
over the world, withal to particularly slight inhabited minor island jurisdictions156, that, in lack 
of other possible means of economic growth, elected to employ their sovereignty to enable free 
footloose capital mobility.157 
 
3.1.3. Evaluating possible differences among multi-varied terminologies 
 
Even though many authors employ the terms indistinguishably and express no 
difference between tax havens and OFCs, for some, the different outsets of the two standings 
discuss the very core of the complexity involved: while OFCs and tax havens are narrowly 
connected, not every jurisdiction would drop into both taxonomies, considering that only a few 
could be identified typically as a tax haven or as an OFC. For others, OFCs encompasses both 
                                                 
154 Through this so-called ‘remote-access’ device, international companies, for instance Shell and 
Unilever, could remain doing business transactions in spite of national territorial occupancy by Allied 
Nations. 
155 Unger, Brigitte and Verbeken, Dirk (2017), Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings 
and challenges, Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific 
Policy, EU: European Parliament, cit. 
156 Among them several British crown dependencies (Channel Islands, Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of 
Man), prior British colonies (Hong Kong, Singapore, the Bahamas, Bahrain and Dubai), or British 
Overseas Territories among which the most important tax havens (the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, British 
Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos and Gibraltar) that are usually protected by western countries with 
leading capital marketplaces. 
157 Unger, Brigitte and Verbeken, Dirk (2017), Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings 
and challenges, Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific 
Policy, EU: European Parliament, cit. 
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tax havens and money launderers, considering that they encourage tax evasion and illegal 
activities on source countries.158 
Besides the historical differences pointed above, whereas a tax haven does not have 
a comprehensive and uniform definition, and is generally understood as a jurisdiction that 
provides tax benefits, an OFC is recurrently referred as a jurisdiction with financial centres or 
institutions that realize transactions chiefly with non-residents on a weighbridge out of 
proportion to the extent of its domestic economy. 
At the same time, both definitions are in many occasions understood 
interchangeably as locations that provide ground to financial operatives to promote free flow 
of capitals from nonresidents and capitalise or loan cash to other nonresidents amidst very little 
or even completely absence of regulations and taxes.159 
Assessing different linguistic variances for the definition of this phenomenon, such 
type of locations may be addressed as well as paradises, refuges or asylums, and some authors 
speculate that a better label would be to refer not as a tax haven, but rather as a financial one, 
considering that its features comprises not only levy incentives, but in a wide agenda, diverse 
and free financial purposes transactions.160 
 
3.1.3.1. Tax Havens 
 
Even though there are divergent views on what constitutes a tax haven, the broad 
acknowledged and sustained depiction was enunciated by the OECD in the Report of 1998161 
which established four main benchmarks for a jurisdiction to be considered as a tax haven, 
being them: (i) no or only nominal taxation or corporate tax on the relevant income, to non-
residents subjects (individuals and companies) principally with the aim to avoid taxation in their 
                                                 
158 Rose, Andrew Kenan and Spiegel, Mark M. (2005), Offshore Financial Centers: Parasites or 
Symbionts?, FRB of San Francisco, Working Paper No. 2005-05, Retrieved from: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.725881 
159 Hampton, Mark P. and Christensen, John (2002), Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax 
Havens, and the Reconfiguration of Global Finance, World Development, 30(9), pp. 1657-1673. 
160 Palan, Ronen, Murphy, Richard, and Chavagneux, Christian (2010), Tax Havens: How 
Globalizations Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, cit., p. 2. 
161 The Report was approved by the OECD Council on 9 April 1998 and was presented to Ministers on 
27 and 28 April 1998. See further at OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global 
Issue, OECD Publishing, Paris, Retrieved from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264162945-en, p. 23. 
Hereinafter: 1998 OECD Report. 
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home jurisdictions, also considered as the starting point to classify a jurisdiction as a tax haven; 
(ii) lack of effective exchange of information, considering that tax havens most commonly 
possess a weak regulation environment in which businesses and individuals benefit from 
secrecy and confidentiality that may shelter them from due authorities investigation and 
prosecution, thereby preventing the effective exchange of information; (iii) an absence of 
transparency in the legislative, legal or administrative operations in order to obstacle home 
countries to persuade protective actions that most commonly embrace a complimentary 
normative background for tax evasion and avoidance; and (iv) no substantial activities, 
translated into the lack of requirements for the transactions that would be developed, to be 
presence-significant.162 
In consonance with the European Parliament163, tax havens supply taxpayers (legal 
and natural persons) with plenty of options to elect the best geographical location for their 
wealth – each of them focus on a diverse feature, the extraterritorial locality for offshore centres, 
and the secrecy or non-disclosure of financial transactions and ownership of resources, in the 
case of confidentiality dominions. 
Truth is, whichever terminology used  – tax or financial haven – they all possess in 
common the main particularity which is to offer a bolthole to evade due taxation, with three 
main characteristics: (i) low or no taxation incidence; (ii) a fictitious residence (with no reality 
correspondence); and (iii) tax secrecy (hence comprising exchange of information and 
transparency). By offering secrecy, opacity, anonymity, and a no or insignificant levy on 
income and capitals, low-tax jurisdictions enable the structure of activities in accordance to the 
tax base and open loopholes for tax avoidance and unlawful performances, specially money 
laundering and terrorism financing.164 
                                                 
162 European Parliament (2017), The Impact of Schemes revealed by the Panama Papers on the Economy 
and Finances of a Sample of Member States, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department D: Budgetary Affairs, Authors: Blomeyer and Sanz et al, Brussels: European Union, PE 
572.717, cit., p. 24. 
163 European Parliament (2018), Listing of tax havens by the EU, European Parliamentary Research 
Service, Members' Research Service, Author: Cécile Remeur, Brussels: European Union, PE 621.872, 
Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/147404/7%20-%2001%20EPRS-Briefing-
621872-Listing-tax-havens-by-the-EU-FINAL.PDF 
164 European Parliament (2017), Understanding the rationale for compiling 'tax haven' lists, European 
Parliamentary Research Service, Members' Research Service, Author: Cécile Remeur, Brussels: 
European Union, PE 614.633, Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614633/EPRS_BRI(2017)614633_EN.pdf 
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On the other hand, it is important to point out that under the current OECD view, 
the politically correct term would be no longer tax havens, but non-cooperative tax jurisdictions 
or non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs). It is so because in 2009 the OECD 
announced that “the era of tax havens had come to an end” and there are presently no 
jurisdictions listed as unabridged unco-operative tax havens by the OECD’s Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs.165 
 
3.1.3.2. Offshore Financial Centres 
 
According to the IMF, an OFC can be defined in a large encompassment as “any 
financial centre where offshore activity takes place”166. From a more practical delineation, an 
OFC is considered as “a centre where the bulk of financial sector activity is offshore on both 
sides of the balance sheet, (that is the counterparties of the majority of financial institutions 
liabilities and assets are non-residents), where the transactions are initiated elsewhere, and 
where the majority of the institutions involved are controlled by non-residents.”167 From this 
standpoint, repeatedly offshore financial markets are used as a definition of a wholesale 
international financial market, such as what was known in the past as the Eurodollar market.168 
In this view, OFCs are commonly implied as “(i) jurisdictions that have relatively 
large numbers of financial institutions engaged primarily in business with non-residents; (ii) 
financial systems with external assets and liabilities out of proportion to domestic financial 
intermediation designed to finance domestic economies; and more popularly, (iii) centres which 
provide some or all of the following services: low or zero taxation; moderate or light financial 
regulation; banking secrecy and anonymity.”169 
                                                 
165 Information by the OECD site on List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/monaco/list-of-unco-operative-tax-havens.htm 
166 International Monetary Fund (2000), Offshore Financial Centers, IMF Background Paper, Prepared 
by the Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm#II 
167 The International Monetary Fund also refers to the term offshore finance as the prearrangement of 
financial services provided by banks and other agents to non-residents, that for oftentimes include the 
lending of assets to non-residents from non-residents. 
168 Palan, Ronen, Murphy, Richard, and Chavagneux, Christian (2010), Tax Havens: How 
Globalizations Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, cit. 
169 International Monetary Fund (2000), Offshore Financial Centers, IMF Background Paper, Prepared 
by the Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, cit. 
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Under a simpler definition, an OFC is a country or jurisdiction that delivers 
financial services170 to nonresidents on a proportion that is inconsistent to the size and the 
financing of its national economy.171 
The OECD literature on the subject establishes than an OFC are “countries or 
jurisdictions with financial centres that contain financial institutions that deal primarily with 
nonresidents and/or in foreign currency on a scale out of proportion to the size of the host 
economy”. In this role, nonresident-owned or -controlled institutions perform a noteworthy 
position within the centre and the parties within the centre could benefit from tax welfares that 
are not accessible to those outside the centre.172 
In a wide-range assessment, it is possible to point out a series of elements that may 
connect cross-border investors to offshores jurisdictions, which are: (i) the incidence of foreign 
citizen residents; (ii) the position of the jurisdiction in the global trade network; (iii) the aptitude 
to magnetize foreign direct investments (FDI)173; (iv) the efficiency of regulations and the role 
of the administration authorities; (v) lower tax rates and corporate tax incentives174; and (vi) 
lack of transparency to conceal beneficial ownership.175 
Considering the key tenacity of OFCs is to offer financial services to nonresidents 
and to export them, earnings from these transfers archetypally derive from: financial services 
owed to nonresidents by entities that are domiciled offshore; bank fees for advisory services 
                                                 
170 In this definition, financial services should include financial services and insurance services (except 
freight insurance), as defined by the United Nations (2002), Manual on Statistics of International Trade 
in Services, United Nations Publications: New York. Nonetheless, insurance services were not included 
for most balance of expenditures assents could not provide breakdowns that the exclusion of freight 
insurance was possible. 
171 International Monetary Fund (2007), Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an 
Operational Definition, IMF Working Paper, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Prepared by 
Ahmed Zoromé. Authorized for distribution by R. Barry Johnston, p. 7, Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0787.pdf 
172 International Monetary Fund (2003), External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users, 
Appendix III, Glossary, Washington DC: IMF, Retrieved from 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5988 
173 Under the OECD definition in OECD (2008), OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Fourth Edition, OECD Publishing, p. 234, cit., a FDI is “a category of investment that 
reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct 
investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise ) that is resident in an economy other than that 
of the direct investor.” 
174 OECD (2001), Corporate Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, OECD Tax Policy Studies 
No. 4, Paris: OECD. 
175 Savona, Ernesto U. and Riccardi, Michele et al (2017), Assessing the risk of money laundering in 
Europe, Final Report of Project IARM, Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 
Retrieved from: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ProjectIARM-FinalReport.pdf 
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and financial manufacturing; intermediary service fees – lines of credit, financial leasing and 
foreign exchange; commissions on funds administration and securities services – brokerage, 
placement of bond issues, underwriting, arrangement of swaps, options and other hedging 
appliances; transactions associated to asset management; security custody services; and 
registration/renewal bills for licensed units – offshore banks, insurance companies, collective 
investment vehicles, international business companies, trusts and States. Since handovers of 
financial wealth to OFCs are repeatedly unregistered, these structures may equally convey non-
financial services, such as of aircraft, brands, patents and copyright registrations.176 
 
CHAPTER 2 – MONITORING THE GREY ZONE 
 
The chart of jurisdictions that are labelled under tax havens, offshores jurisdictions,  
non-cooperative countries and territories or high-risk countries is continuously under review.  
From this perspective, numerous States, international and non-governmental 
organisations ascertain lists of tax havens or high-risk countries177, also called by many as the 
‘name and shame’ approach, as a first step to halt detrimental accomplishes that occur by the 
gaps resulting from worldwide mismatches of financial movements that surpass the national 
boundaries reach.  
The tenacity of diagramming up such lists serves as a means of encouragement to 
jurisdictions that choose to not comply with the elected measures (guidelines, criteria or 
principles) to ratify them in order to be de-listed. In a matter of facts, ‘black’ listing is the 
approach several organisations chose as a means to ensure regulatory compliance is met. As 
previously stated by Braithwaite in 1989, “shaming is a route to a freely chosen compliance”178. 
In this context, standards are established as in or out criteria by the members of the 
organisation which arranges the list, as a form of setting rules to join, gain or remain with the 
                                                 
176 European Union (2018), Handbook on the compilation of statistics on illegal economic activities 
in national accounts and balance of payments, 2018 Edition, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, cit., p. 117. 
177 Palan, Ronen, Murphy, Richard, and Chavagneux, Christian (2010), Tax Havens: How 
Globalizations Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press report at least eleven distinctive lists of 
tax havens, cit. 
178 Braithwaite, John (2007), Crime, shame and reintegration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 10, Retrieved from: Retrieved from http://johnbraithwaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Crime-
Shame-and-Reintegration.pdf 
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membership – in other words, as to become or stay part of the club, one must embrace and 
follow the rules.  
Sundry reproaches have been drawn up for the ‘naming and shaming’ procedure by 
numerous authors179 who outline that plentiful jurisdictions have the structure and / or features 
of tax havens and yet have not been mentioned or listed within official organisations 
assessments.180 
In this sense, the listing stratagem has been several times criticized of being 
incomplete181, considering that specific large and prevailing economies are recurrently omitted 
and politics may also interfere in the legitimacy, transparency and in an up-to-date 
evaluation.182 Nonetheless, the listing procedure endures to be an important tool in providing a 
worldwide standard for monitoring the so-called grey zone. 
 
3.2.1. Tax havens, offshore jurisdictions and non-cooperative countries lists 
 
Since the end of 1990, the IMF has been delivering assorted offshore lists 
assessment that are continuously established on the basis of predefined benchmarks from 
numerous international bodies.183 
                                                 
179 For instance, the work of Palan, Ronen, Murphy, Richard, and Chavagneux, Christian (2010), Tax 
Havens: How Globalizations Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, cit., suggests adding 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as a location for holding companies in Europe. They also 
bring into discussion aspects of rules in the United States and the United Kingdom that might justify 
identification as prominent tax havens. 
180 Gravelle, Jane G. (2015), Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, USA: 
Congressional Research Service, Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf 
181 In Rawlings, G. and Sharman, J. C. (2006), National Tax Blacklists: A comparative Analysis, Journal 
of International Taxation, Vol. 17, No. 9, pp. 38-47 and 64, after a careful assessment of different 
blacklists, the authors pointed out why some countries appeared on a blacklist while others did not. In 
this sense, the authors concluded that lists adopted by countries “tend to be out of date, inaccurate, and 
arbitrary” and that “the methodologies used to compile blacklists are often opaque and do not tend to 
follow any formal procedure.” 
182 Unger, Brigitte and Ferwerda, Joras (2008), Regulating Money Laundering and Tax Havens: The 
Role of Blacklisting, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Discussion 
Paper Series 08-12, Retrieved from https://www.uu.nl/sites/default/files/rebo_use_dp_2008_08-12.pdf 
183 International Monetary Fund (2014), Staff Assessments on Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs), Last 
Update: November 20, 2014, Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/NP/ofca/OFCA.aspx 
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Concerned with the emergence of financial centres and the consequent global 
financial flows that could possibly damage the world’s financial stability, the first blacklist 
related to ML and countries and territories with OFCs, was published by the IMF, in 1999184. 
Taking into account that the Fund’s foremost distress is a financial steady 
environment, to identificate jurisdictions that provide financial services may be suitable for its 
purposes, but it might also deliver an overlook on dominions that work as central facilitators of 
money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion and avoidance.185 
Amongst non-governmental entities prominent works, it is of most relevance the 
efforts briefed by the Tax Justice Network (TJN)186, that conducts a score-based banking 
secrecy measurement, considering the capacity to craft shell companies, offshore arrangements, 
and obstacles to cooperation and exchange of information. Since 2009 and biennially, the TJN 
publishes its Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), a list that ranks jurisdictions according to their 
secrecy and the gamut of their offshore financial activities, probably the largest list of tax 
havens, and includes some specific cities and areas, among them EU jurisdictions and the 
United Kingdom187. 
                                                 
184 International Monetary Fund (2000), Offshore Financial Centers, IMF Background Paper, Prepared 
by the Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, cit. 
185 In International Monetary Fund (1999), Offshore Banking: An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-
Prudential Issues, prepared by Luca Errico and Alberto Musalem, IMF Working Paper, Retrieved from 
https://biblio.parlament.ch/e-docs/360550.pdf it is clarified that “a number of factors ranging from 
favourable regulatory frameworks and convenient fiscal regimes, to the possibility of engaging in illegal 
activities, including money laundering, continue to attract business to OFCs. (…) OFCs are 
jurisdictions where offshore banks are exempt from a wide range of regulations which are normally 
imposed on onshore institutions. (…) Countries may decide to establish OFCs for a number of reasons, 
including gaining access to international capital markets, attracting needed foreign technical expertise 
and skills, and introducing an element of competition in domestic financial systems while, at the same 
time, somewhat sheltering domestic institutions.” 
186 The TJN is an independent international network launched in 2003 that provides high-level research, 
analysis and advocacy on international tax; on the international aspects of financial regulation; on the 
role of tax in society; and on the impacts of tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax ‘competition’ and tax havens. 
See further at https://www.taxjustice.net/ 
187 Annual update of the TJN’s Financial Secrecy Index Retrieved from 
https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/ 
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 Oxfam International188 and the aforementioned ICIJ also advance imperative 
accomplishments in offshores investigating activities, specially through the breakout of 
financial leaks that they continuously provide189. 
In early 2000s, among the eighty-four jurisdictions conventionally scrutinised by 
the OECD, the Organisation categorized a list of uncooperative tax havens in agreement to the 
above-mentioned elected criteria. Until 2002, thirty-one countries pledged to comply with the 
OECD established benchmarks of transparency and exchange of information. 
Nevertheless, at that time seven jurisdictions190 did not make any engagements to 
transparency and exchange of information standards and remained as ‘blacklisted’ 
uncooperative tax havens until the following years: Nauru and Vanuatu made their 
commitments in 2003; Liberia and the Marshall Islands in 2007; and Andorra, the Principality 
of Liechtenstein and the Principality of Monaco only in May 2009. 
Following the intervention of the Group of 20 (G20)191, the former 'black list' was 
sequentially extended to a 'grey' and 'white’ list, in accordance with the level of commitments 
that were made, and respective timetable of implementation assumed by jurisdictions.192  
In 2009, following the G20 London Summit, the OECD reallocated Uruguay, Costa 
Rica, the Philippines and Malaysia from the ‘black’ list of its uncooperative tax havens to the 
‘grey’ list of jurisdictions that have pledged to the internationally agreed tax standard, but at 
that time, had not yet substantially implemented it. 
                                                 
188 On 28 November 2017, Oxfam broadcasted its previsioned list of assessed tax havens concerning 
transparency, fair taxation and participation in international fora on tax matters, outlined in the 
establishing of the EU list by the Council, Retrieved from 
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620625/bn-off-the-hook-eu-tax-
havens-070319-en.pdf 
189 See topic 3.1.1. Financial scandals. 
190 The jurisdictions acknowledged in April 2002 by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs as 
uncooperative tax havens were then Andorra, The Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, The Principality 
of Monaco, The Republic of the Marshall Islands, The Republic of Nauru and The Republic of Vanuatu. 
191 Founded in 1999, the Group of Twenty is a worldwide forum for the governments and central bank 
governors from 19 nations and the European Union, and as of 2017 comprises Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Spain has the status of a permanent guest invitee. 
192 The OECD currently beholds three lists: (i) a white list of jurisdictions that are currently 
implementing or have already absorbed the agreed-upon standard; (ii) a grey list of jurisdictions that 
have committed to the internationally agreed tax standards; and (iii) a black list of countries that have 
not committed. 
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On that opportunity, Switzerland and other countries such as Luxembourg and 
Belgium were then included  in the so-called ‘grey’ list, for they did not yet have fulfilled the 
OECD requirements on exchange of tax related information.193 In the same year, the Swiss 
government swifted to implement the OECD criteria by signing twelve Double Taxation 
Agreements (DTAs) enclosing a section on extended administrative assistance in tax matters194, 
in order to comply with minimum regulation as to be removed from the OECD ‘grey’ index.  
At the EU level, the Council of the European Union, reinforcing the overbearing 
importance to supply effective strengthening apparatuses to fight the erosion of Member States' 
tax bases through tax fraud, evasion and avoidance; and in line with the agenda upheld by the 
G20, the OECD and other international fora, once per calendar year, correspondingly 
establishes a list of EU non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, as an apparatus to 
guarantee a level competing ground195. 
Considering the OECD hasn’t succeeded in deliver an agreed jurisdictions 
enlistment after 2009, the EU has then surpassed the Organisation on stablishing a standard, by 
contributing with a pondered satisfactory work outcome by most involved participants196.  
After a careful deliberation by the Commission and first settled by Member States 
in December 2017, the EU started its own list based on a four-step process of selecting, 
screening, listing and monitoring (or a three-step process of scoreboard, screening and 
listing197) as a device to encourage transformations in a wide-reaching tax common practice.198  
                                                 
193 As explained by Senior Specialist in Economic Policy, Gravelle, Jane G. (2015), Tax Havens: 
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, USA: Congressional Research Service, cit., to be listed as a 
tax haven may result in legal implications if laws and sanctions are contingent on this assessment, 
besides potential sanctions that may be taken by international bodies. 
194 The Federal Council, Portal of the Swiss government, Switzerland removed from the OECD ‘grey 
list’, Bern, 24.09.2009, Retrieved from 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-29205.html 
195 Council of the European Union, The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, 
Brussels, 22 November 2018 (OR. en), 6237/4/18 REV 4, FISC 69, ECOFIN 122, Retrieved from 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6237-2018-REV-4/en/pdf 
196 Dourado, Ana Paula (2018), The EU Black List of Third-Country Jurisdictions, Intertax, Vol. 46, 
Issue 3, pp. 178–180. 
197 As clarified by Dourado, Ana Paula (2018), The EU Black List of Third-Country Jurisdictions, 
Intertax, 46, No. 3, cit., p. 178, the three-step process and based on objective criteria and transparency 
provided the foundation of the recent outcome of a procedure that started in 2016. 
198 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions 
for tax purposes, Brussels, 5 December 2017 (OR. en), 15429/17, FISC 345, ECOFIN 1088, Retrieved 
from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017XG1219(01)andfrom=EN, Hereinafter: December 2017 
EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. 
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The first EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes ‘blacklisted’ 
seventeen jurisdictions199 and put further forty-seven countries on notice in a ‘grey-list’200. The 
benchmarks diagrammed in the external strategy pointed out three central aspects that should 
be taken into account201: (i) transparency, to be achieved through compliance with the 
international standards on automatic exchange of information (AEoI) and exchange of 
information on request (EoIR)202, especially with the scrutiny if a jurisdiction has ratified or 
deposited the multilateral convention203; (ii) fair tax competition, as in assessing the existence 
of harmful tax regimes, contrary to the Code of Conduct principles or the OECD's Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices; and finally (iii) the BEPS implementation package204 by stablishing 
deadlines for jurisdictions to become members (or if and when such commitment will become 
relevant to the Inclusive Framework or implement BEPS minimum standards)205. 
                                                 
199 According to the Annex I of the December 2017 EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, the list was 
then composed by American Samoa; Bahrain; Barbados; Grenada; Guam; Korea (Republic of); Macao 
SAR; Marshall Islands; Mongolia; Namibia; Palau; Panama; Saint Lucia; Samoa; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Tunisia; and United Arab Emirates. 
200 Annex II of the December 2017 EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions provides a comprehensive 
State of play of the cooperation with the EU with respect to commitments taken to implement tax good 
governance principles. 
201 European Parliament (2018), Listing of tax havens by the EU, European Parliamentary Research 
Service, Members' Research Service, Author: Cécile Remeur, Brussels: European Union, PE 621.872, 
cit. 
202 See topic 4.3.1.1. Exchange of information mechanisms. 
203 As explained in OECD (2015), Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax 
Treaties, Action 15 – 2015 Final Report, OECD / G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241688-en, the final report of 
Action 15 of the BEPS package encapsulates the upgrowth of a Multilateral Instrument (MLI) to 
promptly and efficiently amend the current ruling bilateral tax treaties. As a multilateral tool, it offers 
an innovative approach that allows countries to hastily modify more than 3000 existing double taxation 
conventions to implement the measures unfolded throughout the BEPS project work. In the era of 
globalization, the MLI represents the apex of a response promoted by the majority share of the countries 
in the world, to a common problem, as a way to find a solution that meets or at least takes into account 
the individual circumstances collectively. On 22th of March 2018, the OECD announced the deposit of 
the fifth instrument of ratification by Slovenia following those already deposited by Austria, Isle of Man, 
Jersey and Poland, with the Multilateral Convention entering into force on 1st July 2018. 
204 In more recent times, the OECD has centralized attention on its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) project. At a first step, the BEPS Action Plan seeks to identify the main scopes related to the 
erosion behaviour of tax bases and the relocation of revenues. As a tool for study and assessment, it 
comes with a series of recommendations, initially at the soft law level, of which measures the States 
should take to skirmish the negative consequences of globalization in international taxation. The final 
reports on the fifteen OECD actions against BEPS were released on October 5, 2015, coordinating a 
range of commitments to be assumed by the States to re-establish fiscal justice, as a way of ensuring 
that the tax is duly levied in the country where the activities occur, and the values are generated. For 
more information on BEPS, see OECD (2015), Explanatory Statement, 2015 Final Reports, OECD/G20, 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Paris: OECD Publishing, Retrieved from 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf 
205 Annex II of the December 2017 EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. 
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The lists are composed by an Annex I, comprising an EU list of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions for tax purposes – the so-called ‘blacklist’, and an Annex II, concerning the state 
of play of the cooperation with the EU with respect to commitments taken to implement tax 
good governance principles. In line with the Council conclusions, the Code of Conduct Group 
(Business Taxation)206 is entrusted to form review panels with representatives of the EU 
Member States and the European Commission, in order to provide with the procedures of 
screening and listing of 92 jurisdictions that have been previously pointed out by the Code of 
Conduct Group. 
In January 2018, the EU delisted eight of the seventeen abovementioned blacklisted 
jurisdictions207 in addition of commitments made at a high-pitched political level to answer 
EU’s distresses208. In the May 2018 List209, Bahamas and Saint Kitts and Nevis were de-listed 
and were then considered as non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes American Samoa, 
Guam, Namibia, Palau, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago and US Virgin Islands. By confronting 
hazards due to tax abuse and biased tax competition, on 11th of October, the Council of the EU 
published a reviewed list210 excluding Palau; and on the 31 October 2018 List, Namibia was 
then excluded211. 
                                                 
206 The Resolution on the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation was introduced on 1 December 1997 
by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States with the purpose to 
restrain harmful tax competition. Although it is not a legally binding device, but a political commitment 
assumed by Member States, its main intents are to revise, amend or obliterate standing tax measures that 
might constitute harmful tax competition (called the rollback process); and also withhold the upsurge of 
new ones in the future (known as the standstill process). For further information on the Code of Conduct 
Group, see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/code-conduct-group 
207 Dourado, Ana Paula, and Wattel, Peter (2018), Third States and External Tax Relations, Update and 
elaboration, Eds. Marres, Vermeulen, Wattel), Terra / Wattel European Tax Law, Volume I – General 
Topics and Direct Taxation, Kluwer, p. 214. 
208 Council of the European Union, The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, Report 
by the Code of Conduct Group (Business taxation) suggesting the de-listing of certain jurisdictions, 
Brussels, 12 January 2018 (OR. en), 5086/18, LIMITE, FISC 9, ECOFIN 7, Retrieved from 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5086-2018-INIT/en/pdf  
209 Council of the European Union, The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, Report 
by the Code of Conduct Group (Business taxation) suggesting amendments to the Annexes of the 
Council conclusions of 5 December 2017, including the de-listing of two jurisdictions, Brussels, 8 May 
2018 (OR. en), 8304/1/18, REV 1, LIMITE, FISC 178, ECOFIN 356, Retrieved from 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35569/st_8304_2018_rev_1_en.pdf 
210 Council of the European Union, The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, 
Brussels, 11 October 2018 (OR. en), 6237/3/18, REV 3, FISC 69, ECOFIN 122, Retrieved from 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6237-2018-REV-3/en/pdf 
211 Council of the European Union, The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, Report 
by the Code of Conduct Group (Business taxation) suggesting amendments to the Annexes of the 
Council conclusions of 5 December 2017, including the de-listing of one jurisdiction, Brussels, 31 
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On 12th of March 2019, the EU Finance Ministers delivered an updated EU list of 
non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, centred on a vigorous effort to promote a profound inquiry 
of 92 countries by the Commission that takes into account a three-based assessment benchmark: 
(i) tax transparency; (ii) good governance and (iii) genuine economic activity, as well as the 
existence of a zero corporate tax rate metre. 
This analysis provides a prodigious panorama on worldwide established tax good 
governance touchstones, for over 60 jurisdictions have compliantly adopted the Commission's 
standards and more than 100 detrimental governments have been abolished. 
The revision of March 2019 added ten more jurisdictions to the so-called ‘black-
list’: Barbados, United Arab Emirates and Marshall Islands that were on the December 2017 
EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions but were then moved to the ‘grey list’ following 
commitments they had taken, but have now returned to be blacklisted for not having followed 
up and supplementary seven States that were moved from the grey list to the blacklist for the 
same reason: Aruba, Belize, Bermuda, Fiji, Oman, Vanuatu and Dominica.212 
The 34 currently grey listed jurisdictions will continue to be watched through the 
year.213 
                                                 
October 2018 (OR. en), 13352/1/18, REV 1, FISC 423, ECOFIN 949, Retrieved from 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13352-2018-REV-1/en/pdf 
212 Council of the European Union, The revised EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes 
‒ Council conclusions, Brussels, 12 March 2019 (OR. en), 7441/19, FISC 169, ECOFIN 297, Retrieved 
from https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7441-2019-INIT/en/pdf, Hereinafter: March 
2019 EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. 
213 According to the March 2019 EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, the following 
three pillars should be considered: (i) transparency valuation: by the end of 2019 Palau and Turkey are 
committed to implement automatic exchange of information; Anguilla and Curaçao are waiting for a 
supplementary review by the Global Forum for they committed to have a sufficient rating by the end of 
2018; Jordan, Namibia, Palau, Turkey and Vietnam are committed to become member of the Global 
Forum and/or have a sufficient rating by the end of 2019; Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Jordan, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, North Macedonia, 
Palau, Serbia, Thailand and Vietnam are committed to sign and ratify the OECD Multilateral Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance (MAC) or network of agreements covering all EU Member States 
or to have in place a network of agreements covering all EU Member States by the end of 2019; (ii) in 
the fair taxation standard: Costa Rica and Morocco were granted until end 2019 to adapt their legislation 
since they committed to amend or abolish their harmful tax regimes covering manufacturing activities 
and similar non-highly mobile activities by the end of 2018 and demonstrated tangible progress in 
initiating these reforms in 2018; Cook Islands, Maldives and Switzerland were granted until the end of  
2019 to adapt their legislation for they have committed to amend or abolish their harmful tax regimes 
by the end of 2018 but were prevented from doing so due to genuine institutional or constitutional issues 
despite tangible progress in 2018; Namibia is committed to amend or abolish the identified harmful tax 
regimes by 9 November 2019; Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Curaçao, Mauritius, Morocco, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Seychelles; Jordan is committed to amend or abolish harmful tax 
regimes by end 2020; Bahamas, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands were granted until the end 
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Although ten new jurisdictions have been added from the 2018 end-of-the-year list, 
25 countries from the original assessment have now been cleansed. On the other hand, it may 
be considered wearisome to come back to a blacklist assessment when in 2009 the OECD 
publicized that “the era of tax havens had come to an end” 214. 
 
3.2.2. AML / CFT regimes and high-risk third-country monitoring lists  
 
The elaboration of high-risk third country lists offers an important evaluation of 
menaces concerning money laundering and terrorist financing. By concentrating their 
assessment on legal and institutional gauges and including confidentiality and secrecy, they 
provide a widespread analysis on elected criteria also used in the scrutiny of tax havens and 
OFCs. 
On that account, the 4th AML / CFT Directive forecasts, in its section three, Article 
9, that third-country jurisdictions in possess of strategic deficiencies in their domestic AML / 
CFT administrations that represent considerable hazards to the financial system of the Union 
(‘high-risk third countries’) must be identified in order to safeguard the good functioning of the 
internal market. 
In order to do so, Article 9(2) stipulates that the European Parliament and of the 
Council shall sanction the Commission to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64215 
in order to detect high-risk third countries, taking into consideration strategic deficiencies, in 
particular related to: (a) the legal and institutional AML / CFT framework of the third country, 
especially regarding: (i) criminalisation of ML and TF; (ii) measures involving customer due 
diligence (CDD); (iii) provisions concerning record-keeping; and (iv) presuppositions to report 
                                                 
of 2019 to adapt their legislation considering they have committed to address the concerns relating to 
economic substance in the area of collective investment funds, have engaged in a positive dialogue with 
the Group and have remained cooperative, but require further technical guidance; and (iii) Anti-BEPS 
Measures: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eswatini, Jordan, Montenegro, Morocco and Namibia are 
committed to become member of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS or implement OECD anti-BEPS 
minimum standards by the end of 2019; Nauru, Niue and Palau are committed to become member of 
the Inclusive Framework on BEPS or implement OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards if and when 
such commitment will become relevant. 
214 In fact, as of current date, there are no jurisdictions listed as unabridged uncooperative tax havens by 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs. Information by the OECD site on List of Unco-operative Tax 
Havens, Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/countries/monaco/list-of-unco-operative-tax-havens.htm 
215 In a general overview, Article 64 of the 4th AML / CFT Directive summarizes the form and limits of 
empowerment delegated that are foreseen in the Directive. 
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suspicious transactions; (b) the powers and procedures of the third country's competent 
authorities for the purposes of contending ML or TF; and (c) the efficiency of the AML / CFT 
system in addressing its risks of the third country. Also, it is stablished on Article 9(3) a tight 
one-month schedule adoption of the list after the identification of the strategic deficiencies.  
Lastly, the Directive outlines in Article 9(3) that the Commission should consider, 
when drawing up the delegated acts, relevant evaluations, assessments or reports drawn up by 
international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing 
money laundering and combating terrorist financing, in relation to the risks posed by individual 
third countries. 
For the purpose of this specific achievement, the 5th AML / CFT Directive 
expressively empowered the Commission to adopt delegated acts in order to identify high-risk 
third countries, taking into account strategic deficiencies in particular with (i) legal and 
institutional AML / CFT framework of the third country; (ii) the powers and procedures of the 
third country’s competent authorities for the purposes of combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing including appropriately effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; 
and (iii) the effectiveness of the third country’s AML / CFT system in addressing money 
laundering or terrorist financing risks.216 
In this context, the FATF occupies a central role as an international standard-setter 
regarding activities that generate considerable illicit flows of finance, such as tax evasion, fraud, 
corruption and especially ML and TF.  
As previously explained, in 1990, the FATF fulfilled a series of forty 
Recommendations217 that governments should apply to ensure that effective AML programs 
are in place. In the lapse of time comprised between the years of 1996 and 2003, these 
recommendations were then reviewed to follow new developments, especially new money 
laundering practices that continue to upsurge. If fully implemented, these Recommendations 
should provide a country with a comprehensive agenda for successful AML countermeasures. 
Among others, the Recommendations comprise a broad definition of ML and the 
predicate crimes for laundering, the areas that need to be supervised more severely, and the 
regulatory institutions and international cooperation in most necessity. 
                                                 
216 Article 1(5)(a) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
217 FATF Recommendations, cit. 
 66 
By periodically identifying high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions in the AML 
/ CFT arena, the FATF provides a worldwide observed list (known as the FATF-blacklist) and 
hence, used as a reliable resource by the aforementioned Directives at the EU level. The main 
purpose of FATF’s listing procedure is to put blacklisted jurisdictions beneath forceful 
international financial pressure, by engaging the ‘name and shame’ tactic as to harvest the so‐
called ‘stigma effect’.218 
The twenty-five score-based ‘Criteria for Identifying Countries and Territories 
Non-Cooperative in Anti-money Laundering and Terrorist Financing’ were developed ten years 
later after the release of the forty Recommendations and, therefore, are fundamentally centred 
on them. 
The public assessment gives a wholesome summary of the strengths and flaws of 
the AML strategy executed by each country for it takes into account the degree of compliance 
of jurisdictions with the Recommendations, and include a full description of the currently 
procedure used by countries to combat ML, plus efforts that have been already made. 
When accrediting scores, which may vary from fully compliant (FC), largely 
compliant (LC), partly compliant (PC), not compliant (NC) and also include the possibility of 
a not applicable (NA) score, the FATF takes the financial liability of a specific country into 
consideration. In other words, the same policy could be evaluated as a LC for a developing 
country, while it is measured as a PC for a developed country.219 
Jurisdictions presently considered by the FATF220 as in possess of tactical 
deficiencies regarding the compliance mandatory of AML / CFT standards are the Bahamas, 
Botswana, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia and Yemen221. 
                                                 
218 Masciandaro, Donato (2013), Is the Anti Money Laundering Compliance Convenient?, IDB 
Discussion Paper Series, Inter‐American Development Bank, Washington D.C., No. 311. 
219 Unger, Brigitte; Ferwerda, Joras (2008), Regulating Money Laundering and Tax Havens: The Role 
of Blacklisting, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Discussion 
Paper Series 08-12, cit. 
220 The FATF's work operates as a source for a parallel list pinched in Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016, that supplemented Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, by pinpointing high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies. The 
list was supplementary revised by Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/105 of 27 October 2017 and 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 of 13 December 2017, both amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2016/1675. 
221 FATF (2019), Improving Global AML / CFT Compliance: On-going Process, FATF, Paris, France, 
Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-
cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-february-2019.html 
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In February 2019, the FATF stated publicly that the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea is considered a dominion subject to the FATF members and other jurisdictions that 
require counter-measures to safeguard the international financial system from the enduring and 
extensive ML and TF risks, and that Iran territory demands augmented due diligence measures 
proportionate to the constant risks surfacing from this country.222 
Finally, it is important to observe that for banking institutions, arrangements with 
obscure financial transactions can seriously intensificate reputational risks223. However, “the 
fear to loose reputation by being open for criminal money seems to be larger than the reputation 
loss for being a tax haven”224, which means, occasionally, countries succeed to get removed 
from the money laundering list, while many of them still belong to a black or grey tax haven 
list. 
It is so for jurisdictions are worried with the integrity of their financial markets 
since it is not moral to be known as a tax haven, but it is completely intolerable to be associated 
with illegal money or totalitarian’s wealth investments. Whilst tax evasion is in many countries 
still pondered stern but not completely catastrophic, cooperating with organized crime 
definitely is.  
 
PART IV 
THE PRISM OF FISCAL EFFICIENCY 
 
CHAPTER 1 – UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL EFFICIENCY PROBLEM 
 
The study of the Principle of Efficiency had its first developments in the legal 
sphere from the advanced notions in the field of economic sciences, namely in the economic 
                                                 
222 FATF (2019) FATF Public Statement. FATF, Paris, France. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-february-
2019.html 
223 Balakina, Olga; D'Andrea, Angelo and Masciandaro, Donato (2016), Bank Secrecy in Offshore 
Centres and Capital Flows: Does Blacklisting Matter?, Baffi Carefin Centre, Research Paper No. 2016-
20, Retrieved from: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2777380 
224 Unger, Brigitte; Ferwerda, Joras (2008), Regulating Money Laundering and Tax Havens: The Role 
of Blacklisting, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Discussion 
Paper Series 08-12, cit. 
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analysis of law. In this sense, the key point that determines its concept takes into account the 
society’s use of the lowest possible consumption of available goods, with the scope to obtain 
the best profit; in other words, to ponder the maximization of scarce resources in balance with 
the perspective of equality. 
In a broader outlook, the economic discussion on the role of the State was conducted 
in terms of market failures, emphasized by those who wished to justify a larger role; or, in terms 
of government failure, emphasized by those who wished to limit their power.225 Public 
intervention should contribute to the reduction or elimination of market failures226 by producing 
the public necessary goods to meet basic collective needs in order to moderate the exploitation 
of common resources, promoting the alignment or elimination of negative externalities. 
Keeping in mind the focus of these two realities – efficiency and equality –, it is 
necessary to verify how this problem can be transposed into a fair, balanced and efficient model. 
In this scope, in an efficiency perspective, the tax system must always collect taxes in the least 
destructible way, that is, a country’s administration must obtain revenues without incurring in 
the destruction of the assets of each individual.227 That is why tax systems should seek fair 
taxation and economic efficiency in order to promote Social Welfare.228 
To these ends, the core of international tax laws of wealthier countries on pursuing 
capital neutrality may possibly open doors or aggravate the need for poorer countries to perform 
as tax havens. In this sense, a ‘capital neutrality paradox model’ would demonstrate that the 
very chase of capital neutrality may upshot in more jurisdictions to provide free flow 
transactions, but at the cost of effectively undermining worldwide efficiency.229 
 
                                                 
225 Stiglitz, Joseph (1995), Role of Government in the Contemporary World, Paper presented at the IMF 
Conference on Growth and Income Distribution, Washington, DC. 
226 Here understood as the failure of a market to deliver an optimal result. 
227 In the words of Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, “the art of taxation is to pluck 
the goose as to obtain as many feathers as possible with as little hissing as possible.” Translated from 
the French “L'art de l'imposition consiste à plumer l'oie pour obtenir le plus possible de plumes avec le 
moins possible de cris.” 
228 Lobo, Carlos Baptista (2008), Sectores em rede: regulação para a concorrência, Faculdade de 
Direito da Universidade de Lisboa. 
229 Rosenzweig, Adam H. (2010), Why are There Tax Havens? William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 
52, No. 3, 2010; Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-11-03. 
Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1718184 
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4.1.1. Pareto efficient tax structures 
 
Before investigating possible solutions to the complications of modern international 
tax regimes, it is essential to consider why such a setback has occurred in the first place. Bearing 
this in mind, it is possible to speculate that the purpose of the tax system is the initiative of the 
social optimality. 
In economics field, the optimality concept was drawn up by Wilfried Pareto230. 
Following the works of his predecessor Léon Walras, through a Pareto efficiency (or Pareto 
optimality comprehension), a competitive market economy is pondered efficient when it is 
impossible to enhance an individual’s well-being without making at least one individual worse 
off. 
Pareto struggled to prove that a perfectly competitive economy could achieve an 
optimal level of economic justice, by allocating resources in such a manner that they could 
provide positive changes without impairing someone else – fundamentally, in order to be 
efficient, nobody should lose in spite of someone’s gains.231 
In this sense, a Pareto optimum simply indicates that a certain change should be 
socially acceptable only if the welfare of each person is thereby either ameliorated or left as the 
status quo ante. However, to establish economic policies changes of this sort is in a practical 
effect next to impossible since almost unvaryingly somebody has to lose in order to someone 
gain.232 
If inequality is the central issue, Pareto-efficient changes could or could not be an 
improvement233, thus reliant on the first positions of those made better off.234 In practice, there 
                                                 
230 Wilfried Fritz Pareto (15 July 1848 – 19 August 1923) was an Italian engineer, sociologist, economist, 
political scientist, and philosopher that provided numerous contributions to economics, especially in the 
analysis of income distribution and of individuals’ choices. 
231 In this sense, Pareto evidenced that a market economy would always search to allocate resources in 
the most productive possible manner or in the most efficient modus, as a form of distribution of resources 
in such a way it is not possible to make any one individual better off without reducing somebody else’s. 
232 Milanovic, Branko (2015), The haves and the have-nots a brief and idiosyncratic history of global 
inequality, Johanneshov: MTM. 
233 This sort of equilibrium qualifies as a Pareto-suboptimal solution because there could be a feasible 
change, or Pareto improvement, to a condition in which no participant would be worse off and at least 
one performer would be better off. 
234 McWilliams, Douglas (2016), The flat white economy: how the digital economy is transforming 
London and other cities of the future, London: Duckworth Overlook. 
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remains a need for a balance, which determines an efficiency parameter, by reducing the 
asymmetries in line with the equality dimension.235 
The central problem with Pareto optimality is that it does not take into account the 
ever-present interchanges of the cost-effective lifecycle, especially once taxes are introduced236. 
It consequently turns out to be crucial to emphasize the importance of shaping regulations on 
existing international tax regime beforehand any attempt to draw hypothetical conclusions of 
what is the most efficient cooperative solution scenario. 
Considering the aim of a tax system is to collect income, and by assuming that each 
jurisdiction has a minimum revenue necessity237, and that direct international fiscal transfers 
are restricted or impossible, the conclusion is that maximizing worldwide efficiency would 
always and necessarily revert to the benefit of all countries involved. 
But in the reality what actually happens is that each country first chases its personal 
revenue agenda, and only in a second place preoccupies itself in maximize general worldwide 
growth. In this sense, before a common growth goal, the tax competition among countries 
delivers a first-hand unequal system, for this is precisely what jurisdictions pursuit in the first 
place. 
From this perspective, amplifying worldwide capital productivity could be Pareto-
optimal nevertheless of distributional trepidations, for the reason that whichever endeavour to 
counterbalance this allocation disparity could result in deadweight losses238 that surpasses 
eventual distributional profits. This tactic successfully destabilizes the international taxation 
traditional approach to first maximize worldwide growth and then redistribute tax revenue 
                                                 
235 Ryan-Collins, Josh, Toby Lloyd, Laurie MacFarlane, and John Muellbauer (2017), Rethinking the 
economics of land and housing, London: Zed Books Ltd. 
236 Rodrik, Dani (2016), Economics rules: the rights and wrongs of the dismal science, New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company. 
237 Once assumed that tax laws are intended to raise revenue, it is also reasonable to assume that countries 
which adopt a tax system have some marginal amount of income that must be upraised; as the obvious 
consequence the country would not endorse a tax system if not. 
238 As explained in Auerbach, Alan J. and Hines, James Jr. (2002), Taxation and economic efficiency, 
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public 
Economics, Edition 1, Volume 3, Chapter 21, Elsevier, pp. 1347-1421 “tax-induced reductions in 
economic efficiency are known as deadweight losses or the excess burdens of taxation, the latter 
signifying the added cost to taxpayers and society of raising revenue through taxes that distort economic 
decisions”. 
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purely as a matter of equality or distributive justice, thus creating a perfect environment for the 
upsurge of tax havens.239 
 
4.1.2. Taxation and economic efficiency 
 
In early 20th century, economists Shanz, Haig, and Simons argued that the best way 
to tax an agent would be through income taxation.240 Between years 1910-1920, the concept of 
income was established, translated into the patrimonial difference produced during a certain 
time, related to the economic profit. Some earlier, idealized economic models suggested that it 
was optimal not to tax interest income (income from capital),241 but subsequent research showed 
that this result was not robust: capital taxation is not only desirable, but necessary.242 
In his renowned Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty elucidates 
that “taxation is neither good nor bad in itself. Everything depends on how taxes are collected 
and what they are used for.” In this evaluation, the author explains that the per capita income 
growth follows the appeal to devote people incomes to deliver an increasing share of that 
growth to social spending, by assuming that taxes are collected in a transparent and efficient 
manner and used for purposes that each individual approves as of great priority, such as 
education, health, culture, clean energy, and sustainable development.243 
The concept of capital income taxation is therefore intrinsically related to the 
efficiency and equality aspects: from the point of efficiency, it is not intrusive, because when 
the income is obtained, the subject has a sense of enrichment, which constitutes the ideal 
moment for the incidence of tribute. 
                                                 
239 Rosenzweig, Adam H. (2010), Why are There Tax Havens? William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 
52, No. 3, 2010; Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-11-03, cit. 
240 McCann, Ewen and Holmes, Kevin (2010), The Classification of Capital and Revenue in Accounting 
and the Definition of Income in the Market-Place, Victoria University of Wellington – Centre for 
Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research Working Paper No. 73, Retrieved from: 
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241 Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel (2011), A Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation, Working paper, 
Paris School of Economics and University of California at Berkeley, Retrieved from 
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242 Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2013), The price of inequality: How today's divided society endangers our future, 
New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
243 Piketty, Thomas (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, cit. 
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In this context, taxation of income is crucial not only for it is a way of entailing all 
citizens to contribute to the financing of public expenses and projects and to distribute the tax 
burden as fairly as possible; it is also advantageous for determining arrangements and 
promoting information as well as democratic transparency.244  
In addition to the efficiency perspective, there is the equality aspect, related to the 
contributively capacity of the subject and the resulting net variations. It is possible to confirm 
that, in fact, the value that should be set for tax incidence is the concept of real profit, that is, 
the profit that was actually realized, translated into the cost-effective result of a country’s 
economic development. 
Even though “taxes are the price we pay for a civilized society” as stated in 1927 
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
memorably pointed out that “the art of taxation is to pluck the goose as to obtain as many 
feathers as possible with as little hissing as possible.”245 In other words, while taxation is 
indispensable, it must be, atop all, efficient. 
In the tax system, tax must correspond to the appropriate balance between the lack 
of financing of an essential level of public intervention and the efficiency losses resulting from 
the public intervention itself. In its iconic work The Wealth of Nations246, the father of 
economics, Adam Smith, implied that each individual pursuing its own interest would also 
promote the general good if being guided by the invisible hand of a free market context. 
Even though only a century later Adam Smith’s theory would be accurately 
comprehended, a modern version explains that a competitive free-market equilibrium would be 
Pareto-optimal. For this as many other reasons, Adam Smith’s works represent one of the most 
important contributions in the field247. 
In fact, welfare economics248 not only confirm scientifically the cogency of Adam 
Smith's main assumptions, but first demonstrates that government-induced monopolies, 
                                                 
244 Piketty, Thomas (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, cit. 
245 Translated from the French “L'art de l'imposition consiste à plumer l'oie pour obtenir le plus possible 
de plumes avec le moins possible de cris.” 
246 Smith, Adam (1981), The wealth of nations, London: Dent. 
247 Ingrao, Bruna, and Israel, Giorgio (1990), The Invisible hand: economic equilibrium in the history of 
science, Cambridge, Mass: MIT. 
248 In welfare economics, welfare signifies the general well-being or common good of the people. 
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subsidies, and other forms of non-competitive performances may lead to inefficiency and 
leftovers249. 
 
4.1.3. Offshores and tax efficiency 
 
Transposing these understandings to our study, in the tax sphere, capital-exporting 
countries will always seek residence taxation, which is the taxing principle in force, while for 
capital-importing countries there is no doubt that taxation at source is more advantageous.  
Considering that the residence principle for capital income taxation (under which 
taxation by the country in which the investor resides) is preferable to the source principle 
(taxation by the country in which the income arises),250 there is a conflict between the two 
essential taxation principles: source and residence. As will be seen below, the core of the tax 
havens problem focuses on the (de)location of the tax issue, responsible for the inefficiency of 
tax systems. 
According to Adam H. Rosenzweig251, “the phenomena of tax competition and tax 
havens can be attributed, at least in part, to two distinct, but related, implicit sources: the capital 
neutrality and punishment paradoxes. The capital neutrality paradox provides that as barriers to 
capital crossing borders are reduced, the ability to attract capital through tax competition 
increases, thereby creating or exacerbating divergent interests over the taxation of mobile 
capital between marginally capital-attractive jurisdictions and marginally capital-unattractive 
jurisdictions. The punishment paradox, meanwhile, provides that punishing countries which 
engage in tax competition as a result of the incentives of the capital neutrality paradox, will 
necessarily be counterproductive.”252 
Under the convergence model, as the amount of capital in a specific jurisdiction 
expanses, capital returns shrink when paralleled to those in the States with an inferior capital 
                                                 
249 Hahn, F. H., and Arrow, Kenneth J. (1971), Readings in the theory of growth: a selection of papers 
from the Review of Economic Studies, London: MacMillan. 
250 Keen, Michael, and David Wildasin (2004), Pareto-Efficient International Taxation, American 
Economic Review, 94(1), pp. 259-275. 
251 Rosenzweig, Adam H. (2010), Why are There Tax Havens? William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 
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amount, whereas jurisdictions with inferior revenues will partake superior capital claims, 
running, as a result, to greater earnings. 
As a consequence, poorer countries will pay a superior profit on capital when 
compared to wealthier ones, which means, in a simple state, that capital ought mostly to stream 
after high investment countries to short capital countries. In this case, all countries should be 
encouraged to approve a double taxation relief procedure.253 Rich jurisdictions would be 
wealthiest while their national income would accomplish upper earnings abroad, whilst lowlier 
countries would be more affluent pursuing an increase of capital flowing amount precisely to 
them.254  
In such events, a poorer country would be unable to convene the minimum in effect 
revenue persecuted of its internal tax base collection, for it didn’t had the possibility in the first 
place to attract capital through economic returns alone and to start with is a capital-poor 
jurisdiction, trapped, in this sole view, in a deprived poverty-cycle of access to capital. As 
mentioned above, quite because the role of the tax law is to raise revenue for public goods or 
redistribution, once the international tax is taken into account, this whole examination turns out 
as inefficient itself.255 
Therefore, the matter does not concentrates anymore in equality, growth, or 
distributional concerns, but first on the spurs shaped by tax regulations on jurisdictions 
performances, specifically in what degree poorer countries have an encouragement to fairly 
participate in tax competition for they are powerless to foster enough income to encounter their 
minimum revenue necessities.256 
                                                 
253 Trebilcock, M. J. (1995), What makes poor countries poor?: the role of institutional capital in 
economic development, Toronto: Canadian Law and Economics Association c/o Faculty of Law, 
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256 The capital neutrality paradox arises especially considering that slighter countries can use their tax 
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double taxation in the first place. 
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This procedure probably has not been identified in the past for several tax havens 
or offshore jurisdictions offers an absence of income tax rates or near this tax wage, in the form 
of low or zero rates, providing an assumption of little raise of income through tax competition. 
In spite of the fact that tax competition delivers to a number of countries the 
possibility to gather the desirable amount of revenue, this does not imply that small or poor 
country must convert as a tax haven, or that even this was the country’s aspiration in the first 
place. 
Only the most slightly appealing areas would be capable to lucratively apply tax 
haven stratagems, which, of course, must be desired in the first place. Keeping in mind that tax 
havens employ a capital neutrality paradox competitive performance, it is possible to speculate 
that current international tax regime produces motivations to countries to undertake tax haven 
behaviours.257 
In this sense, many authors relate income inequality, which has increased 
considerably in the last decades, to the inefficiency of the domestic tax systems. Evidence points 
out that the majority of the financial assets that are seized in tax havens are from residents of 
the wealthy nations, also known as High-Net-Worth Individuals (HNWI). 
The fact that even when related to poor countries and the rest of the world, the rich 
jurisdictions net assets remains positive, demonstrates that in practical terms, the inequality is 
even deeper than statistics estimations, for a large part of financial revenues are not being taken 
into account.258 
 
4.1.4. Why list jurisdictions and is it effective? 
 
As expounded above, a commonly applied form of tax haven or non-cooperative 
jurisdiction punishment, by a number of countries and organisations such as the OECD and the 
                                                 
257 For example, Ireland is considered a more interesting entrée to Europe than non-EU members such 
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jurisdiction of Vanuatu. 
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G20, is the adoption of the aforementioned procedure of enrolling them under black, grey or 
white lists.259 
Since the history of blacklisting money laundering and tax havens demonstrates that 
it is a very delicate topic for international relations, in order to compatibilize this procedure 
with the global diplomatic agenda, the OECD has recently evolved to a three categorized list to 
label jurisdictions260.  
On another point of view, to punish a taxpayer for investing in a tax haven as a 
means of encouraging cooperation, to some could actually aggravate the whole situation by 
growing the after-tax cost of investments made in the haven country and intensifying tax 
competition assignation.261 
Regarding the FATF money-laundering enlistment, jurisdictions compliance with 
the international standards of the blacklisting policy concerning AML / CFT increased 
significantly in the international policymaking in the last twenty years. Blacklisting embodies 
the cornerstone of worldwide parameters, and an exertion to diminish the risk that some 
jurisdictions or territories may turn into havens for illegal financial undertakings. 
Studies have been made262 considering the inclusion / exclusion from the FATF 
‘blacklist’ as an effective strategy to impact countries’ cross‐border capital flows, and the 
conclusion pointed out was that  “in general, the stigma effect does not exist” for “the use of a 
soft law practice as the blacklisting is likely to be a weak policy solution for a structural 
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problem that has deep roots in the incentive structures of both offshore and onshore 
countries”263.  
Corroborating this enlightenment, it is important to note that sometimes, not all 
flaws are unerringly identified in the FATF listing procedure, because the adopted criteria is 
very specific and do not consider the general identification of gaps that are verified in countries 
assessments, for the FATF evaluations look only at the effectiveness of a country AML / CFT 
framework, as well as its technical compliance with its Recommendations. 
For instance, just three months before the Panama Papers leaks, at the February 
2016 Plenary meeting, the FATF concluded that Panama had then met the commitments from 
its June 2014 action plan by ensuring the required legal and regulatory framework was in 
place264. Even though the FATF did not conclude that Panama was fully compliant with the 
wide range of the FATF standards, the intergovernmental body deliberated that Panama had, at 
that time, taken sufficient action to address strategic weaknesses in its legal, operational, and 
regulatory framework to fight money laundering and terrorist financing, thus deciding the 
country should be removed from its ‘grey list’. 
Despite these remarks, in a solution-based endeavour, it is unmistakable that the 
OECD and other organisations role is in a first attempt, to provide ground to standardize tax 
regimes of countries and only then pursue punishment as a second option. 
The list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes was envisioned in the 
communication on an external strategy in which the European Commission265 outlines that 
listing a jurisdiction should always be considered as a last resort option and should be reserved 
specially for those who refuse to engage on tax good governance matters or fail to 
constructively acknowledge EU concerns with their tax systems. 
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As a matter of facts, the punishment enlistment is not immediately applied, but only 
as a second exertion in case a jurisdiction does not demonstrate good faith and effective 
evidences in adopting fair tax competitive measures. As previously seen, the OECD and the EU 
deliver a periodically wide-ranging peer-review on jurisdictions commitments and 
achievements, intermittently moving countries according to their true enactments under a list 
entitlement to another. 
Yet, once a jurisdiction is drawn up in an EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, 
all Member States must comply with application of counter-measures, that serve not only to 
protect the Member States' tax bases, but also to stimulate the listed jurisdictions to comply 
with regulatory standards into their respectively tax regimes.  
As already clarified by the FATF, “the current list of high-risk and non-cooperative 
countries reflects the countries with the most serious deficiencies that pose a real threat to the 
integrity of the international financial system.” 
Whilst the financial system evolves, so does the techniques and methods that are 
used to launder illegal profits or transfer resources to fund terrorism, which develop 
increasingly to subsist as more intricated and complex. The up-to-date procedure of monitoring, 
peer-reviewing and listing provide a more efficient apparatus to protect the financial system 
environment, for the fact that countries that fail to accurately implement the FATF 
Recommendations generate instability. 
In this panorama, important AML / CFT measures are essential to deliver pressing 
outcomes, specifically because through the listing procedure, the FATF refer jurisdictions who 
fail to achieve minimum standards and with the most alarming breaches to accomplish technical 
compliance. 
In the decade comprised between years 2007 and 2016, the FATF has evaluated 
more than 80 potentially high-risk and uncooperative jurisdictions, publicly identifying 59 of 
them. Among those, 48 countries have committed to address AML / CFT domestic weaknesses, 
thus safeguarding the integrity of the international financial system, “which is only as strong as 
the country with the weakest measures”266. 
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Truth is offshores represent an externality in terms of market failure inefficiency 
consequences and to eradicate them is clearly impossible. If not absolutely effective, as 
suggested above, the listing procedure it at least represents an ancillary device in an attempt to 
promote a more efficient international tax regime for all countries involved, especially 
considering the hierarchy of enlistment currently adopted. 
What the participants involved are presently already trying to build is a world in 
which tax havens couldn’t be reached as an easily accessible resource – an extremely complex 
and undeniably not easy task, and any approach that assists this endeavour must be welcomed. 
 
CHAPTER 2 – PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERING AND GLOBAL TERRORISM 
FINANCING THROUGH OFFSHORES JURISDICTIONS UNDER THE PRISM OF 
FISCAL EFFICIENCY 
 
The majority of money laundering and global terrorism financing arrangements 
partake the fact that criminal organisations exploit opportunities made available by financial 
havens and offshore centres to launder criminal proceeds, for they create obstacles to 
investigate, uncover, halt and punish this sort of activities by hiding the felonious trail. It is so 
for financial havens abide very strict financial secrecy, successfully safeguarding external 
financiers from inquests and prosecutions from their domestic jurisdiction. 
The problem of ML and TF is not only the criminal activities themselves, but all 
apparatuses that sustain delivering opportunities for them to subsist and continue to produce 
funds for their harmful actions. 
Legislative variances amongst countries and its consequent inefficiency of the 
domestic tax systems empowers lawbreakers to benefit of the stemming asymmetries, due to 
the fact that criminals search to exploit loopholes offered in any given jurisdiction, particularly 
OFCs267. 
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4.2.1. The use of OFCs for criminal purposes – loopholes to ML and TF 
 
In 1998, a Report on Financial Havens, Bank Secrecy, and Money Laundering was 
released as a result from the works carried out by the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention in the global programme against money laundering. In that opportunity, the study 
established that “the common denominator in money-laundering and a variety of financial 
crimes is the enabling machinery that has been created in the financial havens and offshore 
centres”.268 
Two decades later, although considerable and ground-breaking efforts have been 
made, the geneses of the problem relating money laundering, terrorist financing and offshores 
jurisdictions remains: financial havens endure to offer an extensive assortment of conveniences 
to foreign stakeholders to endure concealing the origin of their assets, may them be from illegal 
sources or not. 
In order to seek solutions for the problem, as stated in the Conference of the Parties 
to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, to accomplish and implement 
AML / CFT measures and strength forfeiture regimes in line with international standards, one 
must pursuit the objective to “take the profit out of crime”269. 
 
4.2.1.1. Bank Secrecy and financial havens – a confidentiality problem 
 
Considered as one of the strategic pillars of tax havens in the financial systems270, 
bank secrecy constitutes one of the main loopholes that give rise to money laundering activities. 
Since difficulties for law enforcement representatives are magnified by the fact that, in most 
cases, modern economic crime unescapably requires money laundering, the problem is closely 
interrelated to confidentiality laws provided by bank secrecy. 
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As it is well known, offshore banking feeds manifold prospects for money 
laundering, terrorist financing and assorted other criminal activities to take place, for the reason 
of inadequate safeguard or due diligence prevention. In this panorama, national and 
international institutions frequently press OFCs jurisdictions to enforce the AML / CFT 
compliance albeit its bank secrecy domestic regulations271. 
Notwithstanding bank secrecy and financial havens represent different concerns, 
both share an accurate resolution and a profitable validation: they provide shelter to criminals 
with the commitment of ‘doing business at any cost’. By persisting to deliver confidentiality 
for money laundering and various other unlawful actions through bank secrecy and offshore 
banking, OFCs operate as criminality enticements. 
The development of illegal activities, particularly ML and TF, thoroughly 
engenders confidentiality requirements, considering that economic and political motivations 
can encourage national politicians and international banks to request and to allocate banking 
secrecy.272 
As enlightened above273, amidst the most prominent efforts to undermine the 
confidentiality problem, the FATF has drawn up among its international forty-standard 
recommendations, as a precautionary measure, the 9th Recommendation which states that 
“countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit implementation 
of the FATF Recommendations”. 
Following, Recommendation 10 specifies the necessity of customer due diligence 
(CDD) measures, stipulating that “financial institutions should be prohibited from keeping 
anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names”. This Recommendation also 
indicates the necessity of a 5-year obligatory record-keeping, in which “Financial institutions 
should be required to maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, 
both domestic and international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests 
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from the competent authorities”, as to produce, if necessary, the possible reconstruction of the 
individual transactions trail for criminal prosecution.274 
For decades, factual and formal banking secrecy laws have hindered the gather of 
information appeals from both national and international competent authorities such as tax 
administrations and financial regulators.  
Until 2005, most of the settled DTAs did not explicitly comprised provisions to 
prevail upon banking secrecy laws when answering information requests by international treaty 
partners. In this sense, the limit to invoke individual bank information was the foreseeable 
relevance, that aimed to avoid in a first plan, eventual fishing expeditions.275 
Following the works carried out by the G20 Leaders in April 2009 to put an end to 
the era of bank secrecy and the Global Forum reports on exchange of information, in October 
2011 the OECD published the report “The Era of Bank Secrecy is Over”276, in order to 
embolden countries to participate on a multiparty milieu of exchange of information built on a 
bilateral treaty system. At the Cannes G20 Summit, all G20 nations committed to sign the 
OECDs Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(MAC)277, with the objective to enhance the efficiency of the automatic exchange of 
information systems. 
As it has been made clear, the legal barrier to accessing banking data for 
information exchange resolutions has been overawed with the advent of automatic information 
exchange standards, especially with the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) following 
the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) establishment.278 The Multilateral 
Convention drastically addressed the tax evasion problem by putting an end to bank secrecy, 
restraining financial confidentiality and averting swindlers to conceal undeclared funds in bank 
accounts. 
                                                 
274 FATF Recommendations, cit. 
275 Dourado, Ana Paula (2017), Governação Fiscal Global, Coimbra: Almedina, cit., pp. 303-305. 
276 OECD (2011), The Era of Bank Secrecy is Over, Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-
of-tax-information/48996146.pdf 
277 OECD and Council of Europe (2011), The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters: Amended by the 2010 Protocol, OECD Publishing, Retrieved from 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/97892641156606-en 
278 OECD (2012), Automatic Exchange of Tax Information, What It Is, How It Works, Benefits, What 
Remains to Be Done, Retrieved from: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/automatic-exchange-of-information-report.pdf 
 83 
At the EU level, the issue of banking secrecy was present already in the Directive 
77/799/EU279, which, in Article 8, provided the possibility for a Member State not to exchange 
information if it was protected by bank secrecy280. This problem was later addressed in 
Directive 2011/16/EU281, adopted on the basis of Articles 113 and 115 of the TFEU, which 
specifies that in no case the exchange of information upon request shall be declined by a 
Member State solely because this information is held by a bank, other financial institution, 
nominee or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates to ownership 
interests in a person.282  
Under these developments, the limit that cannot be invoked by States in the 
exchange of information is precisely the bank secrecy, in accordance with Article 26(5) of the 
OECD Model Convention, which states that “In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be 
construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because the 
information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or person acting in an agency 
or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates to ownership interests in a person.”283 
In spite of its centennial history of bank secrecy, recently it has been made public 
that the era of Bank Secrecy had come to an end in Switzerland as well, for the country started 
partaking account information. Following the deposit of the instrument of ratification and entry 
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into force in 2017284 of the MAC, Switzerland came in line with the OECD and the G20 
automatic international exchange of information standards on taxation. 
As specified by the agreement, Member States are entitled to annually benefit 
without the need of formal requisition from names, addresses, tax identification details and 
dates of birth of individuals with Swiss bank accounts as well as other data regarding their 
financial situation285. 
Though bearing this in mind, it is imperative to note that poor countries will not be 
part of this measure considering they lack the resources to fulfil the conditions for automatic 
information exchange, for the simple fact that they do not possess the ability to gather and share 
information on financial assets of Swiss citizens that live in their countries, as well as guarantee 
that the data to be disclosed by Switzerland will be used only for tax purposes and persist 
confidential. In other words, Switzerland will exchange information with wealthy countries, but 
also endure to offer citizens of poorer countries the chance to evade due taxation.286 
 
4.2.1.2. Offshore companies as complex business designs 
 
Apart from the bank secrecy problem, offshore structures represent another stake 
on financial havens most prominent undertakings, by providing the necessary secrecy to 
individuals and companies to perform their harmful agenda through concealment of the true 
ownership information behind layers of complex business designs. 
 In a large encompassment, there can be pointed out four main types of offshore 
companies that are used for criminal purposes, which are carried mainly through (i) 
international business companies or corporations (IBC): most oftenly used in ML, tax fraud, 
corruption and other illicit activities, they resemble offshore companies in its most untainted 
formula in its particular regulation applicable, thus differing from local corporations; (ii) non-
resident companies: these sort of companies were shortly introduced after World War II, with 
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the upsurge of multinationals and first international tax planning stratagems, nonetheless, as 
offshore companies that assumed this configuration were only exempted from taxes when 
companies were managed abroad from the jurisdiction of incorporation, they became less used; 
(iii) exempt companies: began as substitute for non-resident companies, and have the 
peculiarity that they may be managed from abroad, and in spite of the fact that they are subject 
to tax obligations in the country of incorporation, they are at the same time exempted below 
specific circumstances; and (iv) zero tax companies: these are the last category of offshore 
companies defined in the literature. Specific countries receive constant international pressure 
to eradicate their harmful tax practices, which by distinguishing between onshore and offshore 
companies, led these jurisdictions to introduce a zero-percentage rate for all corporations.287 
In this context, Multinational Companies or Enterprises (MNEs / MNCs) exploit 
tax haven concealment in marginally dissimilar behaviours then tax evaders, money launderers 
and other criminal individuals. By involving complex business enterprises compound by 
different layers of offshore entities and accounts to camouflage or modify, MNCs pursue tax 
avoidance in order to reduce their corporate tax handbills to zero or even eliciting a tax refund, 
while they relish from vast returns.288  
One of the most common business arrangements through which MNCs oftenly 
diversifies their investments geographically are certain types of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) 
or Special Purpose Vehicle (SPVs), generally described as legal entities that have little or no 
employment, or operations, or physical presence in the jurisdiction in which they are established 
by their parent companies which are archetypally situated in other jurisdictions or economies. 
Amidst the most common examples are financing subsidiaries, conduits, holding companies, 
shell companies, shelf companies, letter-box or brass-plate companies289 that are habitually 
used as manoeuvres to foster wealth or to hold funds and liabilities and most commonly do not 
assume noteworthy production. 
Within the SPEs exemplars are the so-called shell companies, which tend to be 
conduits or holding companies and are generally described as a company that is formally 
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registered, incorporated, or in alternative way legally organised in an economy, that, however 
does not bear any operations in that jurisdiction other than in a pass-through capacity, thus their 
‘shell’ characteristic.290 
Conduit enterprises, on the other hand, are structures that obtain or borrows funds, 
frequently from unaffiliated companies, and forward them to its direct investor or another 
affiliated corporation. Some conduits companies may possess a sizeable physical presence as 
an office building, equipment, employees, or may bear (little) or no physical presence and 
subsist only as shell companies. They are most commonly used as a vehicle to avoid paying tax 
on income in two different jurisdictions – where the parent firm is located and also in the 
jurisdiction where the conduit company is registered. 
By the same token, a holding company is typically established to hold participation 
interests in other corporations on behalf of its owner. Although a few holding companies 
sometimes possess a significant physical presence evidenced by office buildings, equipment, 
and employees, similarly to the conduit companies, in most times they have little or no physical 
presence and may endure only as shell companies, for they do not require to be trading or a 
physical presence.291 
This sort of structures is frequently used by individuals and other business entities 
to demeanour legitimate transactions, among them internal and cross-border exchanges, 
resettlements of revenues, or to facilitate corporate reorganisations, such as mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Even though they are designed after initially legitimate purposes, they are 
frequently castoff for illicit agenda such as tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist 
financing, for the reason that they commonly possess limited liability, no suggestive resources 
or ongoing corporate undertakings and, in most times, even have no physical presence other 
than a mailing address, do not have employees, and do not produce significant economic value. 
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4.2.1.3. OFCs and their role in the money-laundering cycle 
 
In contemporary times, varied and progressively sophisticated money laundering 
techniques have been used to camouflage illicit assets into legitimate means, being, one of them, 
by exploring loopholes provided by OFCs. 
As explained above292, the money laundering cycle is constituted by three main 
phases, which are placement, layering and integration. 
While the placement stage comprises the introduction of illicit funds in lawful 
accounts through the financial system, at the layering phase the launderer aims to detach the 
illicit characteristic of the profits of crime from its source, which is for this carried out by 
multiple complex financial transactions that, in their regularity, size and intricacy look like 
perfectly legitimate. For this process, the launderer can choose for instance any structure that 
provides adequate financial or business arrangement – which is impeccably done through an 
OFC configuration. 
At the layering point, proceeds can transit through several bank accounts at 
countless locations where these complex transactions can be completed, as long as deprived of 
leaving any trail of their geneses or final end. 
Shell and front companies can also be of extensive use in the placement and layering 
phases. For launderers to succeed is crucial for them to hide and remain undetectable behind a 
‘corporate veil’ and a suitable form to provide that it’s through the conglomerate of transactions 
after transactions of multiple accounts, in order to prevent authorities from tracing back to the 
font.293 Precisely in this aspect, the FATF Recommendations closes the gaps if fittingly 
embraced294. 
Shell companies in OFCs with fragile AML / CFT regulations are of common use 
at the placement stage to collect money in species and afterwards directing it to other 
jurisdictions or through the buy of real state consumptions on integration point. 
                                                 
292 For further information, see topic 2.1.1.3. Stages and techniques of money laundering. 
293 European Union (2018), Handbook on the compilation of statistics on illegal economic activities 
in national accounts and balance of payments, 2018 Edition, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, cit. 
294 FATF Recommendations, cit. 
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From layering to integration, distributive transactions between primary offender 
and syndicated money launderers can also be carried out through offshore structures. As 
previously seen, shell companies allow vast sums of income to be expatriated through slight 
allocations, as money is shifted to bank accounts of domestic companies from different 
jurisdictions, mainly comprising OFCs. 
Loans or payments – imports or exports can be easily transferred since very little 
ownership information is available, and it’s quite problematic to accurately pinpoint the 
beneficiary. In this case, third parties, nominees and straw persons are particularly used to 
disguise the true identity ownership.295 
For this specific breach, the FATF provides Recommendations No. 24 and 25 in 
which are established standards to ensure transparency and the authentic beneficial ownership 
of legal persons and arrangements proposals. This pledge is carried out by uttering that 
“Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons for money laundering 
or terrorist financing” and also “should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely 
information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or 
accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities”296. 
From this perspective, integration phase may be achieved through financial and 
non-financial corporations, trade-based money laundering and in most times, predominantly 
through OFCs, which have abundant financial activities. 
Considering that corporate entities may provide bearer shares and engage nominee 
shareholders and directors to masquerade proprietorship and management, for such outcomes, 
the misuse of SPEs depends mainly in the anonymity offered and the regulation framework 
they are subject. 
In any case, it is exactly the blend of operative, unrecognizability and the little or 
even absence of formal supervision that let corporate vehicles in OFCs more vulnerable to 
misapplication. Techniques expended to transfer money to OFCs may adjust to the laundering 
landscape, however, the utmost usual conduits are carried out largely through cash and funds 
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 89 
transfers, misinvoicing of goods and services and straight payments to offshore units or bank 
accounts. 
In the integration stage, by captive financial institutions and money lenders, 
professional gatekeepers can manoeuvre a brass-plate corporation which can be established 
either onshore or in an OFC. Covered as legal and economic entities in the trade records, these 
structures are recurrently topic of assessments and inspections. Captive financial small and 
medium sized institutions can also disguise a substantial quota of their profits. 
Finally, it is important to underline the noteworthy role of professional gatekeepers, 
that provide ‘legal services’ via letterbox or brass-plate companies, and may, as to avoid 
revealing ML activity, not declare income resulted from providing expertise for ML 
accomplishments.  
Amongst most recurrently gatekeepers are lawyers, notaries, property developers, 
accountants and other independent legal professionals that labour as facilitators to empower 
criminal groups to successfully achieve their goals. It is so because the services delivered by 
these professionals ensure a sophisticated machinery and represents a crucial factor in certain 
ML strategies, such as investment in real estate and the setting up of offshore companies, trusts 
and foundations, all of which entail qualified professionals’ expertise and knowledge.297 
In fact, professional gatekeepers’ roles constitute one of the main columns on AML 
agenda and for this reason they are specifically addressed under the FATF Recommendations 
No. 22 and 23, as they are considered Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
(DNFBPs), that must comply in order to countereffect ML / TF behaviours298. 
 
4.2.1.4. The tangled relation between money laundering and tax evasion 
 
With the previous identification of new money laundering techniques, considering 
that tax havens attract mutually illegal and tax evading income, it is crucial to scrutinize the 
link between both offences. The purpose of money-laundering practices advances significant 
concerns regarding a fiscal enforcement environment. 
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While developing their activities, launderers seek to escape the investigations of 
their domestic authorities (specially tax representatives), at least, until the revenues are 
diligently ‘washed’. 
Though regarding the operation process, tax evasion and money laundering are 
basically dissimilar, there are numerous occasions at which tax evasion and money laundering 
partake techniques and can be of joint support. 
In a broader viewpoint, tax evasion implicates taking legally gotten revenues and 
hiding its very existence, for the purpose of disguising its nature and making it seem to be 
characterized into a non-taxable category; or, in other words, it turns legal proceeds into illegal. 
On another perspective, money laundering does quite the reverse, by taking profits of the crime, 
hence, unlawfully earned, and giving it the appearance of being legitimate.299  
Considering that financial havens are jurisdictions that attract both criminal assets 
and proceeds from tax evasion, some countries understand tax evasion as fraud, and 
consequently outline tax evaded income as part of money laundering schemes300. 
In the USA, for instance, ML is considered a sort of tax evasion, but not every tax 
evasion behaviour is sorted out as ML. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)301, ML 
is only tax evasion in development if the fundamental demeanour misapplicates income tax 
laws, specially the aforementioned US Bank Secrecy Act302.  
In this scenario, the FATF, as an international standard-setter, granted a prodigious 
initiative by including tax crimes (related to direct taxes and indirect taxes) amongst precursor 
ML predicate offences, as a form of enhancing transparency and making harder for criminals 
and terrorists to disguise their identities and conceal criminal profits behind legal persons and 
entities.303 
                                                 
299 United Nations (1998), Report on Financial Havens, Bank Secrecy, and Money Laundering, United 
Nations  Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Global Programme Against Money Laundering, 
Retrieved from https://www.amnet.co.il/joomla/attachments/UN-
FINANCIAL%20HAVENS%20laundering.pdf, cit. 
300 Unger, Brigitte; Ferwerda, Joras (2008), Regulating Money Laundering and Tax Havens: The Role 
of Blacklisting, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Discussion 
Paper Series 08-12, cit. 
301 The IRS is the revenue service of the United States Federal Government. For further information on 
the IRS, see https://www.irs.gov/ 
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This means that, in spite of the fact that the FATF does not ascertain global 
standards for tax crimes or other misconducts, executing the intergovernmental body standards 
enhances measures to prevent tax evasion, as the relocation of proceeds through offshores can 
be reduced by AML / CFT mechanisms.304 
From this perspective, the FATF AML / CFT standards aim to safeguard the 
financial system from misuse as a whole. In this sense, countries exertions in their task to 
advance AML / CFT framework enforcement must concentrate on the high-level objective in 
which “financial systems and the broader economy are protected from the threats of money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, thereby strengthening financial 
sector integrity and contributing to safety and security”305. 
Through the integration of the FATF standards, at the EU level, tax crimes are 
considered as significant ML menaces, and therefore, comprised among ML arrangements that 
must be counter effected under the 4th and the 5th AML / CFT Directives. 
In this sense, the 4th AML Directive encompassed ‘tax crimes’ under the 
comprehensive definition of ‘criminal activity’, that must be punishable by means of the 
sanctions under a common basis by the Union framework306, despite of different domestic law 
definitions of tax offences designations by each Member State.307 
The foremost remarks regarding tax crimes related to AML / CFT measures in the 
EU Directives refers to an attempt to establish ways of enhancing transparency through 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and beneficial owner information’s, being the ladder of 
particularly importance to improve public inquiry as to prevent the abuse of legal entities and 
structures comprising tax avoidance308. 
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In a fiscal efficiency evaluation, a central measure to address the topic of tax 
evasion, is specifically by certifying that structures of offshore wealth are successfully taxed, 
primarily through international cooperation and identification of the accurate beneficial 
ownership309. 
It is so for tax evasion through offshore centres have been found to intensificate the 
backdown of the global taxation of wealth, considering HNWI are more likely to hide resources 
offshore for the purposes of seeking refuge in tax havens as to avoid taxpaying 
responsibilities310.  
 
CHAPTER 3 – ASSESSING BREACHES AND TRACKING SOLUTIONS 
 
In order to enable fiscal efficiency to be successfully achieved, to address eventual 
breaches is decisive to ensure operative and effective attempts of solutions are being 
continuously tracked. 
For this purpose, specific mechanisms are essential for the sound functioning of the 
financial markets and their consequent trustfulness, especially regarding financial information 
and transparency. 
 
4.3.1. International cooperation: a key to tackle money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism through offshore jurisdictions 
 
Nevertheless the world has become a globalized network with no barriers for 
financial streams, in which international collaboration on tax compliance has changed into the 
adopted standard311, efforts to frustrate or circumvent new systems for exchanging information 
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endure, highlighting the need for unrelenting precaution as to guarantee the continue 
accomplishment of transparency.312 
Already in the 1st Resolution established by the 1988 Drugs Convention313, it was 
emphasized the importance of international cooperation as well as a timely and efficient 
exchange of information between countries in order to achieve transparency and enable crime 
investigation to be carried out in a wholesome worldwide basis. 
According to the FATF standards, all countries should proceed on a wide-ranging 
best practice of transnational cooperation, in both requesting and providing international 
information situations. 
At the time of requesting due cooperation, competent authorities should employ 
their best efforts to deliver all-embracing accurate and proper legal information, such as (i) 
urgency aspects, as to enable a timely and efficient execution; (ii) the forecast use of the 
information demanded; and (iii) feedback to the requested competent authority on the utility 
and importance of the information to be obtained. 
The requested authorities, on the other end, should not decline a request for 
assistance when: (i) the request involves fiscal matters; (ii) regulations entail financial 
institutions or professional gatekeepers to uphold privacy or confidentiality (except when the 
information that is wanted is held under legal privilege or professional secrecy); (iii) when there 
is an investigation or prosecution being already conducted in the requested country (unless the 
assistance would obstruct that proceeding); and (iv) the nature or status (civil, administrative, 
law enforcement) of the requesting counterpart authority is diverse from that of its foreign 
requested counterpart. However, it is important to underline that “exchanged information 
should be used only for the purpose for which the information was sought or provided”.314 
Under the most recent EU AML / CFT legislative developments, exchange of 
information and the provision of assistance amid competent authorities of the Members States 
is positioned as indispensable, and as a result, the FATF Member States should not forbid or 
allege arbitrary or unjustifiably obstructive requisites on exchange of information and 
assistance provisions315.  
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4.3.1.1. Exchange of Information mechanisms 
 
Regarding the mechanisms of exchange of information in the tax international 
environment, as explained above, they are thoroughly entrenched to augment transparency in 
order to counteract the fiscal inefficiency that perils the financial system, thus consequently 
vital to fight organized crime and pose viable obstacles to the successful accomplishment of its 
agenda. 
It is so because regulations that avert fruitful interchange of appropriate data with 
other governments on tax payers that profit from the low or no tax jurisdiction and that are 
absent in tax transparency provide the necessary gaps for criminal endeavours to take place. 316 
In this scenario, it is imperative to emphasize the work that has been carried out 
since 2000 by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, a multilateral framework on transparency and exchange of information that gathers 
both the OECD and non-OECD economies. Under the works perpetrated by the Global Forum, 
two internationally agreed standards on transparency and exchange of information for tax 
purposes have been developed: The Exchange of Information on Request (EoIR) and the 
Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI), in particular with respect to the Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS).317 
After its renewal in 2009, the Global Forum has made crucial advances on the 
implementation of the international high standards on tax transparency. Despite of its effusively 
embedded and broadly use, to specifically request certain data through the EoIR standard has 
revealed insufficient in the era of an interconnected world. Technological improvements 
showed that an Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) standard befitted progressively 
feasible as an apparatus to supplement and strengthen the EoIR to increase tax transparency and 
further enhance international cooperation to guarantee tax compliance standards are met.318 
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The Common Reporting Standard (CRS), settled in retort to the G20 plea to enhance 
tax compliance and endorsed by the OECD Council in July 2014, make an appeal to 
jurisdictions to gather information from their financial establishments and exchange them on 
an automatic and annual basis with other countries. 
As referred previously in the present study319, the EoIR standard already forecasted 
that bank secrecy could not be invoked to avoid exchange of information upon request.320 Being 
this the new model, since 2014, the international standard adopted is the AEoI, developed in a 
joint effort by the Global Forum, the OECD and the G20 countries321.  
It is important to note that the new AEoI standard was inspired on the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which relates to financial information and implies the 
transmission of balances and movements of bank accounts, created succeeding the UBS 
banking scandal events322. With the enter into force of the FATCA, in 2010, the USA 
government created an instrument to prevent US persons from avoiding due payment of their 
income taxes by the concealment of assets offshore. 
Even though FATCA and CRS may likewise possess noteworthy gaps, due 
diligence and its mechanisms in international tax law field represent a promising enterprise to 
enhance the AML / CFT framework enactment, which can be better achieved by a uniform 
exchange of information standard in order to ensure “that every resident of every country that 
imposes an income tax be forced to pay his or her tax obligations”. This is fundamental to 
prevent the destabilisation and solidity of the income tax system, the main formula chosen by 
States to counteract the deepen of the inequality problem.323 
The development of the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (MAC)324, conjointly by the OECD and the Council of Europe in 1988 and amended 
by Protocol in 2010, comprises the most wide-ranging multiparty mechanism in terms of tax 
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cooperation to wrestle tax avoidance and evasion, which, in a globalized financial world, 
constitutes an uppermost resolution for all nations. 
At the Union Level, the 2011 EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation325 
obliged all Member States of the Global Forum as well as Member States of the EU to exchange 
information according to rules that are identical for all. 
Considering that “an increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of tax collection is 
therefore urgently needed”326, the Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 
subsequently amended Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of 
information in the field of taxation, towards an improvement of the administrative cooperation 
between Member States efficiency under conditions compatible with the proper functioning of 
the internal market327. 
Precise information on financial accounts is not only crucial to provide and improve 
interpretation of international transactions, but especially vital as an accurate identification of 
the agents involved – as a viable means to enable the correct taxation in each State, the precise 
identification of possible money laundering and tax evasion, the identification of 
intermediaries, and of beneficial owners of taxable income.328 
In order to counteract ML and TF behaviours that explore gaps enabled by offshores 
jurisdictions, exchange of information is crucial to overcome the liabilities of the financial 
markets and enhance transparency. 
To improve due diligence in international tax law represents a must persistent 
strategy to endure increasing international cooperation in order to facilitate and safeguard a 
reliable and swift exchange of information between Member States on illegitimate financial 
flows, which epitomises the very core of how to comprehensively address the problem.329 
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4.3.1.2. Financial Intelligence Units role 
 
Bearing in mind that money launderers, terrorist and other law-offenders practice 
their wrongdoings globally, particularly by the relocation of illegal proceeds from one country 
to another by exploring weak jurisdictions legislative environments, financial information is 
imperative to tackle this sort of harmful behaviour in an interconnected world.330 
In its 40-Recommendations package, the FATF sets out essential measures that 
nations should apply to battle money laundering and terrorist financing, remarking the crucial 
importance of facilitating international cooperation for those ends. On this account, national 
cooperation and coordination is placed in the 2nd Recommendation as “countries should have 
national AML / CFT policies, informed by the risks identified, which should be regularly 
reviewed, and should designate an authority or have a coordination or other mechanism that 
is responsible for such policies.” 
For the accomplishment of such objective, the intergovernmental body exerts the 
imperative role of effective devices to empower countries to collaborate, coordinate and 
exchange domestic with each other, concerning the development and enactment of strategies 
and undertakings for AML and CFT measures.331 
Amongst its best-practices and guidelines compendium, the FATF formerly 
established the importance of FIUs, as an essential mechanism to serve as a national centre to 
obtain and scrutinize: (i) suspicious transaction reports; and (ii) significant information 
regarding ML, related ground violations and TF. 
For those enactments, FIUs should be fit to receive information from reporting 
entities and be granted access on an appropriate footing to the financial, administrative and law 
enforcement information necessary to perpetrate its functions accurately332, between both 
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counterparts and non-counterparts333. On developing such tasks, FIUs serve as main 
representatives of countries in trading important financial information worldwide. 
On these circumstances, the standard set was of obligatory reporting of suspicious 
transactions through FIUs, whenever a “financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds 
to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, 
it should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit 
(FIU)”.334 
As underlined by the 7th Recommendation on information security and 
confidentiality, all information obtained, treated, retained or broadcasted by the FIU must be 
securely protected, traded and employed in agreement with laws, regulations, policies and pre-
established formalities. For this accomplishment, an FIU must observe security and 
confidentiality on handling sensitive information, as to guarantee that its staff members possess 
safekeeping authorization levels, as well as carefulness and mindness of their accountabilities 
and obligations335. 
In the EU legislative framework developments, succeeding the works conveyed by 
the FATF, the concept of FIUs was first introduced in the Third AML / CFT Directive. In 
Recital (11), the Directive first established that “Suspicious transactions should be reported to 
the financial intelligence unit (FIU), which serves as a national centre for receiving, analysing 
and disseminating to the competent authority’s suspicious transaction reports and other 
information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing”. 
This should not compel Member States to change their existing reporting systems 
where the briefing is done through a public prosecutor or other law enforcement authorities, as 
long as the information is forwarded promptly and unfiltered to FIUs, allowing them to conduct 
their business properly, including international cooperation with other FIUs.”336 
This reference inaugurated FIUs fundamental role in the EU Member States 
coordination and cooperation, in deference of exchanging of information, with the creation of 
a high-level distributed mainframe network in the EU context to fight ML and TF, named after 
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FIU.net337, with the objective to facilitate transparency mainly through financial exchange of 
information.338 
In an attempt to detail regulations boundaries for the international FIUs processing 
of personal data information, the 4th AML / CFT Directive safeguards sensible and unhindered 
access by FIUs to substantial financial data339, enabling empowerment for units to undertake 
crucial action, hence improving coordination and cooperation between national authorities. 
As to enhance transparency to skirmish the misuse of legal entities, Member States 
should ensure all necessary information and keep a central catalogue on their beneficial 
ownership information340, which is placed as a key element in tracking criminals who could 
conceal their identity behind a corporate structure. In fact, the Directive proposes that FIUs 
should afford free exchange of information – spontaneously or upon request – including with 
third country parties.341 
Under the 5th AML / CFT Directive, the main purposes of FIUs is “to collect and 
analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between 
suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing, and to disseminate the results of its analysis as well as 
additional information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money 
laundering, associated predicate offences or financing of terrorism.”342 
FIUs roles are enhanced particularly on the virtual currency’s matters: in this new 
configuration environment, exchange of information between countries it’s of decisive 
importance to struggle the risks linked to the anonymity, which allows potential 
mismanagement for illicit resolutions. In such circumstances, national FIUs must be able to 
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find and provide accurate information, in order to permit them to associate virtual currency 
addresses to the identity of its owner.343 
The 5th AML / CFT Directive also reiterates FIUs imperativeness on identifying the 
financial operations of cross-border terrorist networks, as well as perceiving their financial 
sponsors for the purposes of uncovering the enablement of terrorist wrongdoings and terrorist 
organisations arrangements. 
In this context, despite their diverse domestic financial intelligence structure, 
Member States should ensure international standards are met through a resourceful and 
synchronized methodology to promote full achievement of international financial 
investigations. For the successful attainment of such endeavours, countries must provide access 
to FIUs through facilitated exchange of information in accordance with the appropriate 
cooperation with law enforcement authorities. 
In vital matters such as terrorism hazards, by elucidating the powers of and 
collaboration between FIUs, information should stream straightforwardly and hastily without 
unjustifiable postponements, which is therefore essential to further heighten the efficiency of 
FIUs efforts.344 
As it may be observed, FIUs constitutes one of the most imperative apparatuses in 
AML / CFT countermeasures, for they concentrate an embodiment of Member States domestic 
financial intelligence to provide free-flow information, which corresponds, in a globalized 
environment, to the central key to struggle spread-out criminal activities, specially money 
laundering and terrorist financing menaces through offshores structures. 
For this purpose, financial intelligence units (FIU), together with policy-makers, 
law enforcement authorities, supervisors and other allied adept authorities are placed as 
important mechanisms for countries to guarantee that international and national cooperation are 
achieved at the policymaking and operational levels, which must be, of course, in agreement to 
Data Protection and Privacy procedures, specially the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR).345 
 
                                                 
343 Recital (9) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
344 Recital (16) of the 5th AML / CFT Directive. 
345 FATF Recommendations, cit., No. 2. 
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PART V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the words of the Deputy Managing Director of the IMF and economy specialist, 
Min Zhu, “Effective anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regimes 
are essential to protect the integrity of markets and of the global financial framework as they 
help mitigate the factors that facilitate financial abuse.”346 
Throughout this study, the main objective was specifically to demonstrate the 
potential rapport between tax havens, money laundering, the financing of terrorism and how 
could possibly the improvement of fiscal efficiency play a key role to solve those at a first view, 
unalike and dissociated concerns. 
Although, at first, they seem to be utterly unrelated subjects, recent financial 
scandals has demonstrated that, in fact, all aforementioned illegal behaviours are fundamentally 
related in their essence: money launderers and financiers of terrorism often look out for the 
same loopholes to perform their undertakings, which require fundamentally secrecy and 
confidentiality as to be successfully accomplished, which is easily made available by OFCs. 
Every day, new structures are built in order to enhance money laundering schemes 
and terrorist funding activities, with the objective to escape legislation boundaries as well as 
due scrutiny from authorities. Criminals that endure in these harmful activities, oftenly sear 
jurisdictions that may provide a weak legislation environment and, in most times, even pursuit 
to attract these types of investments as a way of economic subsistence. 
Bearing in mind that money launderers and terrorist supporters frequently explore 
the same gaps searched for tax evaders to escape due taxation, to improve the efficiency of the 
tax system, especially by enhancing transparency and the uniformization of exchange of 
information mechanisms could be a way out to ‘kill two birds with one stone’.  
These sorts of behaviours are, as largely explained above, inherently associated 
with the increase of social inequality, for they impede nations of due taxation and investment 
of huge deviated amounts of revenues on education, public health and necessary safety for its 
citizens. Described as the most serious crisis of capitalism since the crash of 1929, the global 
                                                 
346 International Monetary Fund (2018), The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism, Communications Department, Washington, D.C: IMF, cit. 
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financial crisis that commenced in 2007–2008 has directly impacted on the worsen of income 
inequality and consequently increased these sorts of criminal accomplishments. 
In suchlike endeavours, it is of main importance the role enacted by jurisdictions 
and organisations, specially by the OECD, the FATF and the European Union, that must 
continue to consider changes to the standards, in light of new emerging configurations regarding 
the springing of innovative threats and vulnerabilities to the global financial system. Tax 
administrations also play a key role in the fight against, money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism. Globalization makes it necessary to strengthen mutual assistance and exchange of 
information between States, in order to obviate the negative effects of increasing and non-
surveyed free-flow of capitals in the international market. 
In yet another assessment, one thing remains factual: AML / CFT regulation has 
become a cornerstone of a denser schedule to skirmish criminals’ activities, by denying 
lawbreakers of their ill-gotten compensations and by prosecuting those who assist in 
accomplishing such attempts. To enhance law-enforcement likewise plays a decisive role in 
crime obstruction, since the removing of financial incentive to committing offences with the 
trace, freeze, and confiscation of profits is crucial for reducing criminal’s financial 
possibilities.347  
One of the main challenges that must be addressed resides specifically in the 
different regulation’s discrepancies among countries, that as a consequence provide a fragile 
milieu and enable illicit activities to take place, if not under domestic eyes, at offshores 
jurisdictions that provide so. 
A minimum and uniform standard, in spite of nations dissimilarities, as it is already 
being commencing to be sorted out by worldwide organisations, is hence essential to deliver a 
slightest stability to the financial system as a whole. 
Tax havens would incontestably undergo striking damages if financial transparency 
was to become an unescapably and unified pattern. From this perspective, international 
financial transparency is a crucial matter for the modern fiscal state to be able to deliver 
substantial and irrevocably changes.348 
                                                 
347 Borlini, Leonardo Sergio (2018), Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the 
International Instruments, Oxford University Press, Yearbook of European Law, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 3287423, cit., pp. 553–598. 
348 Piketty, Thomas (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, cit. 
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To fight terrorism and counter the laundering of assets, it is vital to have optimal 
information exchange and precise data, in order to afford deconstruction of organized 
criminality agenda. 
With that knowledge in mind, it is important to note that nations alone do not 
possess the self-sufficiency and capability to counter entirely and effectively the harmful 
actions arising from globalization, which can and will be better achieved at global level. The 
development and improvement of severer regulations is necessary, even indispensable, but it 
would be innocuous to believe that it would be plainly accepted, for most countries would be 
implausible to adhere without sanctions.  
Despite the fact that it is not clear whether the benchmarks already taken by 
international bodies such as the FATF, the IMF, the OECD, the G20 and the EU will result in 
effective outcomes, it is decisive to endure the combined efforts in order to seek a fair, efficient 
and above all, transparent arrangement. 
In tax harmonization, the BEPS package and the MLI displays the most profound 
efforts to deliver a better worldwide tax environment, representing a true landmark in the 
advancement of the international tax regime.349 
It should be emphasized that globalization has also produced, in contrast to the 
negative aspects upraised, a greater ease of interaction between countries, through the formation 
of economic blocs and enhancement of ties towards a common goal: sustainable and economic 
growth. 
Financial information is the utmost important and strategic asset in confronting 
money laundering, terrorist financing and contending severe offences in a broader perspective. 
Taking into account the fact that money launderers, terrorist and other lawbreakers drill their 
wrongdoings globally, mainly by the relocation of illegal income from one jurisdiction to 
another by exploring weak legislative circumstances, financial information is imperative to 
tackle this variety of harmful performances in an interconnected world.  
Elected as between the uppermost main concerns of the European Agenda on 
Security, preventing and fighting ML and TF are crucial and their progressive menaces must 
                                                 
349 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Xu, Haiyan (2018), A Global Treaty Override? The New OECD 
Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Limits, 39 Mich. J. Int'l L. 155, Retrieved from: 
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be correspondingly accompanied by fast developments regarding the counter effect regulations, 
mainly those that enhance transparency mechanisms in the exchange of information field. 350 
In this sense, the enlargement of Exchange of Information on Request (EoIR) and 
the introduction of the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) marked a step change in tax 
transparency and in the ability of tax administrations to combat offshore activities, thus its 
harmful ML and TF subsistent endeavours351. 
Despite its ingrained loopholes, the CRS, the FATCA and the EU Directives 
represent promising mechanisms in such attempt. On the other hand, of most importance of all 
is the establishment of a due diligence standard that delivers a better uniformization system of 
transparency and exchange of information.352 
As a matter of fact, exchange of information “as a standard, is a condition for a 
balanced allocation of taxing rights, since it will lead to transparency on the tax burden raised 
by each jurisdiction and to fair competition among the jurisdictions wanting to attract 
investment”353 and represents the very key to improve transparency and avoid the core of the 
problem, which is exactly the anonymity, obscurity and opacity made available by offshore 
jurisdictions. 
In the world panorama, it is clearly perceptible that it will not be possible to exhaust 
money laundering and terrorist financing hazards, as new structures upraise every day exploring 
different weaknesses and breaches of the financial systems. 
Enhancing transparency, addressing challenges and persistently tracking solutions 
globally is decisive if organized crime endeavours are not to become a permanent and ingrained 
feature of a globalization process that only promotes inequality, but also provides fairer 
competition in a trustful and solid financial environment, under the optimization of the fiscal 
efficiency. 
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351 Johannesen, Niels, and Gabriel Zucman (2014), The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 
Tax Haven Crackdown, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1), pp. 65–91. 
352 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Mazzoni, Gianluca (2018), Due Diligence in International Tax Law, 
University of Michigan, Public Law Research Paper No. 608, cit. 
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